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RESOLVING INTERSTATE CONFLICTS OVER SAME-SEX 
NON-MARRIAGE 
Hillel Y. Levin* 
Abstract 
States have adopted several different regimes of recognition for same-
sex couples. A few states allow same-sex couples to marry; several others 
offer marriage-like partnerships (usually called civil unions), which 
provide all or nearly all of the substantive rights and responsibilities 
associated with marriage; still others offer marriage-lite partnerships 
(sometimes called reciprocal benefits arrangements), which provide a small 
subset of the rights and responsibilities associated with marriage; and, of 
course, others offer no recognition at all. 
What happens when these regimes of recognition collide? For example, 
what happens when a couple marries in Massachusetts and then moves to a 
marriage-like state, like New Jersey? Will, and should, New Jersey 
recognize the Massachusetts marriage as a marriage under New Jersey law; 
or should it refuse to recognize it entirely; or should it automatically 
convert the relationship to New Jersey’s marriage-like alternative? 
Concerning these issues, which I call the marriage/marriage-
like/marriage-lite conflicts, the law is deeply unsettled. Further, until now, 
scholars have focused nearly exclusively on conflicts that arise between 
states that recognize same-sex marriage and those that offer them no 
recognition at all, ignoring the marriage/marriage-like/marriage-lite 
conflicts; and the approaches they have offered do not translate to this new 
context. This Article fills this lacuna and offers a new framework for 
resolving the marriage/marriage-like/marriage-lite conflicts. It also 
explores some substantial implications of this new approach. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Only a few states currently permit same-sex couples to wed.1 However, 
several states that balk at the idea of extending marriage to same-sex 
                                                                                                                     
 1. The history in brief: In 2004, Massachusetts became the first state in the United States to 
allow same-sex couples to marry. See Same Sex Marriage, Civil Unions and Domestic 
Partnerships, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid= 
16430 (last updated Sept. 2010). A decision by California’s supreme court made it the second state 
to do so in 2008, but a ballot initiative (Proposition 8) overturned that court decision. Id. However, 
a federal district court recently overturned Proposition 8, holding that the federal Constitution 
provides a right to same-sex marriage. Id. Connecticut’s and Iowa’s supreme courts required those 
states to allow same-sex couples to marry. Id. Next, when Vermont’s legislature overrode a 
gubernatorial veto, it became the first state to successfully enact a same-sex marriage bill 
legislatively. Id. In June 2009, New Hampshire also adopted same-sex marriage. Id. The District of 
Columbia also performs same-sex marriages. Id. 
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couples are willing to grant rights and responsibilities typically associated 
with marriage when they are packaged under other names. Thus, some 
states (the “marriage-like states”) offer alternatives functionally identical,2 
or at least nearly so,3 to marriage;4 and others (the “marriage-lite states”) 
provide same-sex couples with some but not all of the rights and 
                                                                                                                     
 2. The marriage-like states are those that essentially provide state marriage rights to same-
sex couples but give the rights different names. These relationships are often called civil unions, but 
they have sometimes been called (as in California) domestic partnerships. See, e.g., In re Marriage 
Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 444 (Cal. 2008) (recognizing that California “affords substantive legal rights 
and benefits to a couple’s family relationship that are comparable to the rights and benefits afforded 
to other couples”), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.5, as 
recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 63–64 (Cal. 2009); see also Kerrigan v. Comm’r of 
Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 416 (Conn. 2008) (affirming trial court determination that the 
Connecticut civil union statute “entitles same sex couples to all of the same rights as married 
couples” except the right to call the relationship a marriage).  
 3. See, e.g., Opening Brief on the Merits at 40–42, Clinton v. State (In re Marriage Cases), 
183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (No. S147999) (acknowledging that California domestic partnership 
statute extends functionally equivalent rights to same-sex couples despite minor differences but 
arguing that a “separate but equal” approach violates the California constitution); Brief of the 
Plaintiffs-Appellants with Separate Appendix at 10–12, Kerrigan, 957 A.2d 407 (No. S.C. 17716) 
(conceding that Connecticut civil union statute “acknowledg[es] that committed lesbian and gay 
couples are identically situated to and deserving of the same legal rights as married couples” but 
asserting that the legislature fails to follow this acknowledgement to its logical end by extending the 
status of marriage to same-sex couples); see also infra Part II.B. 
 4. At one time or another, marriage-like states have included California, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297–297.5 (West 2010) 
(establishing California domestic partnerships that provide “the same rights, protections, and 
benefits” as an opposite-sex marriage); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457-A:6 (2010) (“[T]he parties who 
enter into a civil union pursuant to this chapter shall be entitled to all the rights and subject to all 
the obligations and responsibilities provided for in state law that apply to parties who are joined 
together pursuant to [the marriage statutes].”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-32 (West 2010) (enumerating 
several rights for civil unioned same-sex partners); Oregon Family Fairness Act, 2007 Or. Laws ch. 
99, § 9 (codified as OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 106.340 (West 2010)) (establishing Oregon domestic 
partnerships granting rights to same-sex partners “on equivalent terms” with opposite-sex married 
couples); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1202, 1204 (2010) (granting “[p]arties to a civil union . . . the 
same benefits, protections, and responsibilities under law . . . as are granted to spouses in a civil 
marriage”); S.B. 5688, 61st Leg., 2009 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2009) (“The provisions of this act shall 
be liberally construed to achieve equal treatment, to the extent not in conflict with federal law, of 
state registered domestic partners and married spouses.”). In addition to the marriage-like states in 
the United States, several European countries, New Zealand, and parts of Australia, Brazil, Mexico, 
Argentina, and Uruguay also offer marriage-like alternatives for same-sex couples. See, e.g., Penny 
McLintock & Elizabeth Byrne, Gay Couple Ties Knot in Ceremony, ABC NEWS (Austl.), Nov. 25, 
2009, http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/11/25/2753087.htm; Same-Sex Marriage Legalized 
in Argentina, CBC NEWS, July 15, 2010, http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2010/07/15/argentina-
same-sex-marriage.html; Marriage and Partnership Rights for Same-Sex Partners: Country-by-
Country, ILGA EUROPE, http://ilga-europe.org/home/issues/families/recognition_of_relationships/ 
legislation_and_case_law/marriage_and_partnership_rights_for_same_sex_partners_country_by 
_country (last visited Oct. 15, 2010); Civil Union, N.Z. DEP’T OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS, 
http://www.dia.govt.nz/diawebsite.nsf/wpg_URL/Services-Births-Deaths-and-Marriages-Civil-Uni 
on?OpenDocument (last visited Oct. 15, 2010).  
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responsibilities associated with marriage.5 (The majority of states, of 
course, offer no recognition to same-sex couples.6) As the country 
continues to grapple with the debate over same-sex relationships, more 
states are likely to experiment with these alternative models.7 As a result, 
we can expect more and new kinds of conflicts of laws, at least until all 
states opt to, or are compelled by the Supreme Court to, perform and 
recognize same-sex marriage.8 
                                                                                                                     
 5. Marriage-lite alternatives are sometimes called civil unions, domestic partnerships, or 
reciprocal benefit arrangements. Sometimes featuring such incidents of marriage as inheritance 
rights, workers’ compensation, the right to sue for wrongful death, health insurance and/or pension 
benefits for state employees, hospital visitation, and healthcare decision-making, marriage-lite states 
include Hawaii, New York, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C-6 
(West 2010) (extending limited rights to same-sex reciprocal beneficiaries but explicitly providing 
that reciprocal beneficiaries enjoy fewer rights than married opposite-sex couples); FAIR WIS. EDUC. 
FUND, WISCONSIN DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP PROTECTIONS REFERENCE GUIDE 3–4 (2010), available 
at, http://assets0.percolatesite.us/w/005/images/0000/1406/fair_wi_domestic_partnership_guide_8. 
2.2010.pdf?1280805178 (detailing various benefits for same-sex partners in Wisconsin); Domestic 
Partnership Registration, OFFICE OF THE CITY CLERK, THE CITY OF N.Y., http://www.cityclerk. 
nyc.gov/html/marriage/domestic_partnership_reg.shtml (last visited Oct. 15, 2010) (providing a 
summary of New York domestic partnership benefits). In addition, although it is now a marriage-
like state, New Jersey continues to recognize marriage-lite relationships in some cases. See N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 26:8A-4.1 (West 2010) (permitting domestic partners to remain as such after passage 
of the New Jersey civil union statute but prohibiting new domestic partnerships for same-sex 
couples). Finally, several countries and jurisdictions around the world have analogous marriage-lite 
provisions. See Barbara J. Cox,  Using an “Incidents of Marriage” Analysis when Considering 
Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Couples’ Marriages, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 
13 WIDENER L.J. 699, 701 (2004) (listing Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greenland, Iceland, 
Norway, and Sweden as providing limited rights to same-sex couples). 
 6. Several states have adopted constitutional provisions prohibiting same-sex marriage or 
other alternatives while others have done so through legislative channels. See Lynn D. Wardle, 
From Slavery to Same-Sex Marriage: Comity Versus Public Policy in Inter-Jurisdictional 
Recognition of Controversial Domestic Relations, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1855, 1858. 
 7. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & DARREN R. SPEDALE, GAY MARRIAGE: FOR BETTER OR 
FOR WORSE?: WHAT WE’VE LEARNED FROM THE EVIDENCE 251–57 (2006) (describing the “emerging 
menu” of options available to same-sex couples in different states). 
 8. It is worth noting that there is rapid change in this area, with states moving from one 
category to another. See, e.g., Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, N.Y. 
TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/s/same_sex_marriage/index. 
html?scp=3&sq=same-sex%20marriage%20ban%20florida&st=cse (last updated Aug. 13, 2010) 
(showing the rapid progression of Proposition 8 in California). In particular, there has recently been 
a good deal of movement into the marriage category, especially (but not only) among marriage-like 
states, and we will likely see that trend continue. Id. However, we should not expect the marriage-
like and marriage-lite categories to disappear anytime soon, leaving ours a marriage/no-recognition 
country. Many no-recognition states have adopted constitutional provisions prohibiting same-sex 
marriage, which, coupled with continued opposition to same-sex marriage in these states, makes it 
exceedingly unlikely that we will see a move towards marriage everywhere in the foreseeable future. 
Id. Furthermore, no-recognition states and marriage-lite states are not necessarily moving to become 
marriage states. In Washington, for example, the legislature passed a marriage-lite scheme and then 
subsequently passed a statute providing marriage-like benefits to same-sex couples. Press Release, 
Office of the Governor, Gov. Gregoire Signs Legislation to Expand Rights to Domestic Partners 
(May 18, 2009), available at http://www.governor.wa.gov/news/news-view.asp?pressRelease=1236 
&newsType=1. In addition, it looks as though the federal government, if it were to move out of the 
4
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What happens when a same-sex couple married in a marriage state 
moves to a marriage-like state; or from a marriage-like to a marriage-lite 
state; or from a marriage-lite to a marriage state—and so on? Do they keep 
their rights and responsibilities? Do they lose them as they cross the 
border? Does it depend, and if so, on what? Consider these examples: 
 
• A same-sex couple marries in Massachusetts (a 
marriage state) and moves to New Jersey (a marriage-
like state). One spouse is incapacitated and 
hospitalized. Can the other spouse direct medical care 
and make end-of-life decisions? Can he even visit his 
husband in the hospital?9 What if the incapacitated 
spouse dies? Who inherits? Who assumes the 
decedent’s debts?  
 
• The same facts, except that the couple moves to 
Hawaii (a marriage-lite state) instead. 
 
• A couple enters into a marriage-like relationship in 
New Jersey and moves to Massachusetts. Before 
officially getting married, they decide to split up. One 
member of the couple wishes to marry someone else. 
Can she? Must she dissolve her union in New Jersey 
first? If so, how and where? 
 
• A couple enters into a marriage-lite relationship in 
Hawaii and then moves to New Jersey or 
Massachusetts. What rights, if any, do the members of 
the couple automatically enjoy in the new state? 
 
These are what I refer to as the marriage/marriage-like/marriage-lite 
conflicts, and they will create substantial problems for same-sex couples, 
                                                                                                                     
no-recognition category at all, would more likely adopt a marriage-like or marriage-lite scheme than 
a marriage scheme, at least in the foreseeable future. Therefore, even as we see relatively rapid 
change in this area—and even as more states become marriage states—we can expect that the 
alternative categories will maintain their durability, and the marriage/marriage-like/marriage-lite 
conflicts will only become more common. 
 9. The issue of partners visiting each other in the hospital is one that has featured 
prominently over the years in the debates over same-sex relationships. For a recent example, see 
Tara Parker-Pope, Kept from a Dying Partner’s Bedside, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/19/health/19well.html?_r=1. Also, President Barack Obama 
issued an executive order requiring all hospitals receiving federal funds to allow visitation by same-
sex couples.  Michael D. Shear, Obama Extends Hospital Visitation Rights to Same-Sex Partners of 
Gays, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/ 
04/15/AR2010041505502.html. 
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as these examples show.10 Resolving these problems is enormously 
important.11 As Justice Robert Jackson argued more than sixty years ago, 
“If there is one thing that the people are entitled to expect from their 
lawmakers, it is rules of law that will enable individuals to tell whether 
they are married and, if so, to whom.”12  
Unfortunately, the law is a mess, and existing legal scholarship offers 
little by way of guidance. The relevant literature tends to focus on those 
conflicts that arise between marriage states and states that offer no 
recognition whatsoever for same-sex couples (the marriage/no-recognition 
conflict),13 and the extant approaches are contestable normatively and 
descriptively. Further, they ignore marriage-like and marriage-lite 
relationships almost entirely, thus offering little guidance for resolving 
conflicts that involve such relationships.14 
                                                                                                                     
 10. Wardle, supra note 6, at 1858–59 & nn.9–10 (citing Hillel Y. Levin, Marriages, Civil 
Unions Collide in CT, CA Court, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 15, 2008, at A9, available at 
http://www.jpus.org/forum/index.php? showtopic=95&mode=threaded). 
 11. Conflicts issues have arisen in litigation. See, e.g., Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170, 
172 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002) (declining to dissolve, in Connecticut, a civil union lawfully formed in 
Vermont); Lane v. Albanese, No. FA044002128S, 2005 WL 896129, at *2–4 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
Mar. 18, 2005) (following the reasoning of the Rosengarten court to decline to dissolve a 
Massachusetts same-sex marriage in Connecticut); Alons v. Iowa Dist. Court for Woodbury 
County, 698 N.W.2d 858, 862–63 (Iowa 2005) (reviewing procedural history of case in which the 
Iowa district court utilized its equity powers to dissolve a same-sex marriage entered into in 
Vermont); Salucco v. Alldredge, No. 02E0087GC1, 2004 WL 864459, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 
19, 2004) (permitting dissolution of Vermont civil union in Massachusetts upon consideration of 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Defense of Marriage Act, state statutes and case law, and the 
court’s equity powers); Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hosp. of N.Y., 765 N.Y.S.2d 411, 417–22 (Sup. Ct. 
2003) (considering similarities in public policies of Vermont civil union statute and New York 
wrongful death statute and concluding that these policies permit wrongful death recovery in New 
York for a plaintiff whose partner—legally joined in a Vermont civil union—died in New York), 
rev’d 802 N.Y.S.2d 476, 477–80 (App. Div. 2005) (requiring strict adherence to wrongful death 
statute and therefore preventing plaintiff spouse from recovery); In re Estate of Chase, 515 
N.Y.S.2d 348, 349–50 (App. Div. 1987) (denying adoptive child the right to inherit from a natural 
parent in accordance with New York law even when adoption took place in accordance with Rhode 
Island law, a state that permits such inheritance). For a more complete list and a discussion of 
various cases, see Wardle, supra note 6, at 1906–09, app. A. For a real world illustration of the 
problems unioned or married couples encounter, see Cox, supra note 5, at 703–11. 
 12. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 553 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 13. See Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public 
Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1976–92 (1997) (asserting that the public policy doctrine of 
the traditional conflicts analysis violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution and 
therefore a forum state must recognize relationships lawfully entered into in other jurisdictions even 
if doing so violates the forum state’s public policy). 
 14. See Peter Hay, Recognition of Same-Sex Legal Relationships in the United States, 54 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 257, 257–58 (2006) (structuring conflicts argument using framework of recognition and 
non-recognition of same-sex relationships); Kramer, supra note 13, at 1965–66 (focusing on 
recognition of same-sex marriage in no-recognition states); Wardle, supra note 6, at 1907 (framing 
debate in terms of states that recognize same-sex relationships and those that do not). Even the most 
careful scholars writing in this area address the marriage/marriage-like/marriage-lite conflicts only 
as an afterthought to their considerations of the marriage/no-recognition conflict. See generally 
ANDREW KOPPELMAN, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT STATES (2006) (focusing on the marriage/no-
recognition conflict). Professor Andrew Koppelman’s otherwise excellent book Same Sex, Different 
6
Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss1/2
2011] RESOLVING INTERSTATE CONFLICTS 53 
 
This Article offers the first analytical framework for resolving 
marriage/marriage-like/marriage-lite conflicts. Rejecting the approaches 
offered by scholars as unsatisfactory and inapplicable, I develop an 
approach rooted in the horizontal federalist values embodied in conflicts 
law. By comparing the marriage/marriage-like/marriage-lite conflicts to 
other kinds of conflicts that present similar patterns, I argue that forum 
states should, to the degree possible, sever those elements of same-sex 
relationships entered into in foreign states that are contrary to local policy 
but accept the remainder. This approach allows us to articulate sensible, 
straightforward, and fairly comprehensive rules for addressing the 
marriage/marriage-like/marriage-lite conflicts. 
Further, this analysis has substantial implications for other areas of the 
law, both practical and abstract. From a practical standpoint, the approach 
sheds new light on the oft-discussed marriage/no-recognition conflict. 
Additionally, it offers a solution to several complicated questions that may 
arise in the event that the federal government adopts a marriage-like or 
marriage-lite scheme, as seems likely. From a more abstract perspective, 
the underlying question and the approach that I offer suggest that the 
meaning of marriage itself is unstable and deeply contestable. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II reviews the different options 
that states have for resolving marriage/marriage-like/marriage-lite conflicts 
and shows that the law is deeply unsettled. Part III reviews the extant 
literature concerning conflicts over same-sex relationships and shows why 
it is normatively and descriptively unsatisfactory and that it fails to 
sufficiently address the marriage/marriage-like/marriage-lite conflicts. Part 
IV develops my alternative approach. Part V expands the inquiry beyond 
the marriage/marriage-like/marriage-lite framework and considers how my 
approach sheds light on several other practical questions. Finally, I 
conclude by briefly exploring the important abstract implications of my 
approach to conflicts arising from same-sex relationships.15 
                                                                                                                     
States—the very best resource available on this topic—devotes nearly all of its attention to 
addressing the marriage/no-recognition conflict, but it offhandedly remarks that “[i]n [marriage-
like] states, foreign same-sex marriages ought to be simply treated as if they were civil unions.” Id. 
at 108. He does little to explain why this should be so, even while noting that some marriage-like 
states seem to prohibit this approach. See, e.g., infra Part II.B (discussing the peculiar case of the 
marriage-like state of Connecticut). Moreover, Koppelman does not address other crucial conflict 
patterns, including the marriage-like/marriage conflict (the reverse of the marriage/marriage-like 
conflict), the marriage/marriage-lite conflict and its reverse, and the marriage-like/marriage-lite 
conflict and its reverse. This is not an indictment of Koppelman’s book, of course. It simply 
demonstrates why there is more work to be done. 
 15. Unfortunately, debates over conflicts in the context of same-sex relationships sometimes 
seem to have more to do with the positions of the scholars on the substantive question of same-sex 
marriage as they do with anything else. That is, those who favor same-sex marriage seem to 
interpret conflicts law in such a way that leads to expanded recognition of those relationships while 
those who oppose same-sex marriage seem to interpret the law in precisely the opposite direction. I 
therefore believe that some full disclosure on my part is appropriate.  
I am strongly in favor of same-sex marriage, for both normative and legal reasons. However, for 
three reasons, I also believe that conflicts law is not the appropriate avenue through which same-sex 
7
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II.  THE PROBLEM 
In this Part, I present the backdrop of the marriage/marriage-
like/marriage-lite set of conflicts. I first show that the states’ approaches to 
these conflicts vary widely. I then argue that policymakers have failed to 
resolve the problem in a satisfactory way. 
A.  The States’ Current Approaches to the Marriage/Marriage-
Like/Marriage-Lite Conflicts 
Although courts and legal scholars have not yet satisfactorily addressed 
the marriage/marriage-like/marriage-lite conflicts, states have begun to 
develop policies for dealing with them. The law in the marriage/marriage-
like conflict context—what happens when a married same-sex couple 
moves from a marriage state to a marriage-like state?—is the most 
developed, and so I begin there. I then expand the scope to include the 
other new conflicts patterns. 
1.  Possible Resolutions of the Marriage/Marriage-Like Conflict 
Conceptually, for couples relocating from a marriage state to a 
marriage-like state, the marriage-like state has three plausible options: 
Option 1: Treat the couple as married. That is, although the 
forum state would not perform the marriage, it could 
recognize and adopt the status afforded by the marriage state 
as a matter of comity.  
 
Option 2: Decline to recognize the relationship altogether. In 
other words, because the forum state does not permit same-
sex couples to marry, it could simply reject the relationship 
entirely.  
                                                                                                                     
marriage should advance. First, proponents of same-sex marriage have claimed the mantle of states’ 
rights; turning around and using conflicts law as a wedge to advance same-sex marriage across the 
country is thus problematic. Second, the debate over same-sex marriage should be conducted on its 
merits rather than through the use of technical legal devices. That is, while I do not oppose 
advances through the courts per se (though legislatures and grass-roots movements seem at least as 
viable right now if not more so), those advances should come in cases that argue on the basis of 
equal protection or the like rather than on the basis of peripheral arguments rooted in conflicts law. 
Advances of the first sort are more likely to be lasting and perceived as legitimate, and they are also 
more likely to fundamentally alter how same-sex couples are viewed by the American polity. Third, 
and perhaps most importantly, I believe that the most convincing conflicts analysis—mine, to be 
specific—is unlikely to satisfy partisans of either side. 
In other words, what I offer here is not part of an agenda to advance or retard the recognition of 
same-sex marriage, and I do not believe that it particularly accomplishes either of those goals. 
Because I am a partisan of same-sex marriage, I must admit to some hope that my analysis will 
become obsolete or irrelevant in the near future because all states adopt same-sex marriage. Until 
then, this Article represents my best efforts to use a very complicated body of law to resolve a 
specific set of legal questions. 
8
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Option 3: Do not recognize the marriage, but, consistent with 
forum policy, automatically provide the maximum 
recognition for the couple afforded in the forum state. For 
example, a marriage-like state such as New Jersey could 
automatically treat a same-sex couple lawfully married in 
Massachusetts as though it had already entered into New 
Jersey’s marriage alternative. 
Each of these options is realistic. The third option—which I will argue 
later is the right result—has prevailed in a number of marriage-like states, 
including New Jersey and New Hampshire.16 But other states, including 
Connecticut (before it became a marriage state) and, until recently, 
California,17 have adopted the second option and chosen to accord no legal 
status to same-sex couples lawfully married in marriage states.18 Indeed, 
                                                                                                                     
 16. For New Jersey, see N.J. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 3-2007 (2007), available at 
http://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases07/ag-formal-opinion-2.16.07.pdf. For the rule in practice, see 
N.J. Vital Statistics: Frequently Asked Questions: Civil Union Records, N.J. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
SENIOR SERVS., http://www.state.nj.us/health/vital/faq.shtml#cur (last visited Oct. 15, 2010), which 
reads: 
Am I required to enter into a civil union in New Jersey if I am already in a civil 
union or same-sex marriage in another state or country? 
No. You are not required to enter into a civil union in New Jersey. If your civil 
union or same-sex marriage meets the requirements of the state or country in 
which you registered, then it is recognized by the State of New Jersey as a civil 
union. However, if you wish, you may also elect to enter into a civil union in New 
Jersey. In that case, you would file for a Reaffirmation of Civil Union License in 
New Jersey. 
New Hampshire is now a marriage state, but when it was a marriage-like state, it took the same 
approach as New Jersey. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457-A:8 (West 2010) (repealed 2011) (“A 
civil union or a marriage between a man and another man or a woman and another woman legally 
contracted outside of New Hampshire shall be recognized as a civil union in this state, provided that 
the relationship does not violate the prohibitions of this chapter.”); see also About Civil Unions, 
N.H. FREEDOM TO MARRY COAL., http://www.nhftm.org/Xtras/civilunions.html (last visited Oct. 15, 
2010) (explaining that a couple whose relationship is “already recognized elsewhere” does not need 
a New Hampshire civil union to access New Hampshire state-based legal rights). 
Substantively, as my discussion will show, I believe that the New Jersey attorney general 
arrived at the correct conclusion, but the analysis leaves something to be desired. The opinion does 
not reflect a conflicts approach and is deeply confused. It provides little support for its assertions 
about legislative intent and, in any case, offers little guidance to other jurisdictions because it relies 
so heavily on what it takes to be one particular legislature’s intent. 
 17. California Bill to Recognize Some Same-Sex Marriages, CNN.COM, Oct. 12, 2009, 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/10/12/california.samesex.marriage/index.html. But see Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding Proposition 8 
unconstitutional and enjoining its enforcement). 
 18. For Connecticut’s decision, see Conn. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 2005-024 (2005), 2005 WL 
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this question is so contested that it is sometimes the focus of intense 
political lobbying.19 
With respect to the remaining possibility—recognizing a same-sex 
marriage performed elsewhere as a marriage under forum law—it may 
seem farfetched. After all, why would a state that does not allow its own 
citizens to marry in same-sex unions treat similarly situated citizens from 
other states differently—better, in fact—by recognizing their marriages? 
However, it is not particularly farfetched at all, given that states often 
choose the law of other states based on interests like comity and 
uniformity. Further, while no marriage-like state has yet adopted this 
approach, there is reason to believe that some might do so. Some state 
officials contemplating same-sex marriage have found it impossible to 
enact a same-sex marriage law but easier to legalize recognition of same-
sex marriages performed in other states, particularly where this can be 
achieved outside of legislative politics. For example, in New York, a 
marriage-lite state,20 and one in which same-sex marriage bills have faced 
difficulties in the legislature,21 the governor controversially directed state 
agencies to treat same-sex couples lawfully married in other jurisdictions 
as married for the purposes of New York law.22 Rhode Island and the 
                                                                                                                     
2293060. For a discussion of the opinion, see infra notes 28–37 and accompanying text. For a 
summary of the law in California, see Nancy L. Ober & Paul R. Lynd, The Wedding Cake Falls: An 
Update on Same-Sex Marriage and Domestic Partner Issues After the San Francisco Marriage 
Decision, http://library.findlaw.com/2004/Sep/27/172880.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2010) (“Same-
sex marriages from other jurisdictions . . . will not trigger any rights under California[’s] domestic 
partnership law. Individuals in lawful marriages—even those not recognized in California—are 
excluded from California’s domestic partnership law.”). 
 19. See Stephen Clark, NH Anti-Recognition Bill Reintroduced, SAME SEX CONFLICTS, 
http://www.samesexconflicts.com/blog/2009/1/10/nh-anti-recognition-bill-reintroduced.html (Jan. 
10, 2009, 7:30 AM) (describing the repeated attempts of New Hampshire legislators to amend the 
code to decline recognition of same-sex relationships lawfully entered into in other states). 
 20. See Domestic Partnership Registration, supra note 5 (listing various city and state rights 
but emphasizing that a New York domestic partnership does not include numerous rights extended 
in a cross-sex marriage, including the right to obtain workers’ compensation death benefits, the 
right to petition a court for property partition under the framework of marriage, and the right to sue 
for wrongful death). 
 21. See Nate Silver, Whip Count: Gay Marriage Faces Uphill Odds in New York Senate, FIVE 
THIRTY EIGHT BLOG, http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2009/05/whip-count-gay-marraige-faces-
uphill.html (May 13, 2009, 8:43 PM) (speculating that a recent gay marriage bill, approved by the 
New York General Assembly, would likely fail in the state senate, where Democrats hold only a 
slight majority, not all of whom support the bill); see also Danny Hakim & Jeremy W. Peters, 
Senate Democrats Try to Reverse G.O.P. Coup, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2009, http://www.nytimes. 
com/2009/ 06/10/nyregion/10switchsub.html (describing the Republican coup in the New York 
Senate, spurred in part by the state’s new same-sex marriage bill, ending in virtual Republican 
control of the legislature and a likely end to same-sex marriage talks). 
 22. See Martinez v. County of Monroe, 850 N.Y.S.2d 740, 743 (App. Div. 2008) 
(recognizing a foreign same-sex marriage in New York); Jeremy W. Peters, New York Backs Same-
Sex Unions from Elsewhere, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/29/ny 
region/29marriage.html; see also Nicholas Confessore, Court Backs Paterson Regarding Gay 
Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/03/nyregion/03marry.html 
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District of Columbia followed suit.23 Internationally, Israel, best viewed as 
a marriage-like jurisdiction, did the same and recognizes foreign marriages 
as marriage for the purposes of Israeli law.24 Given these examples, it is 
entirely conceivable that more states, including some marriage-like states, 
will choose to recognize same-sex marriages lawfully performed elsewhere 
as marriage for local law purposes. 
This is all to say that there is no consensus among the marriage-like 
states on how to resolve the marriage/marriage-like conflict. 
2.  The Remaining Conflict Patterns 
Thus far, I have sketched only the possibilities that present themselves 
in the case of relocation from a marriage state to a marriage-like state. It is 
easy to see, though, that these same possibilities exist in the case of a move 
from a marriage state to a marriage-lite state (the marriage/marriage-lite 
conflict). That is, a marriage-lite state could, as New York has, recognize a 
same-sex marriage performed in another state as a marriage; it could 
automatically convert the relationship to the state’s marriage-lite 
alternative; or it could, as most marriage-lite states have, refuse to 
recognize the relationship altogether.25 And, of course, the same options 
                                                                                                                     
(“The decision [that Governor David Paterson acted within his power to require the New York 
government to recognize same-sex marriages performed out of state] is the latest in a string of 
rulings by state courts that have upheld the right of same-sex couples who were married in other 
jurisdictions to have their marital status recognized in New York . . . .”). 
 23. For Rhode Island, see Katie Zezima, Rhode Island Steps Toward Recognizing Same-Sex 
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/22/us/22rhode.html?ex 
=1329800400&en=60b8729465adf8c1&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss (announcing the 
reversal of the Rhode Island attorney general’s opposition to recognition of Massachusetts same-sex 
marriages in Rhode Island and his new opinion that these marriages should be recognized in the 
state); see also Katie Zezima, Rhode Island Couple Wins Same-Sex Marriage Case, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 30, 2006, http://travel2.nytimes.com/2006/09/30/us/30gay.html (describing Rhode Island 
attorney general’s original opinion). 
While the District of Columbia is obviously not a state, it was a marriage-lite jurisdiction until 
it became a marriage jurisdiction. See What are the Benefits of Participation?, D.C. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH, http://dchealth.dc.gov/doh/cwp/view,a,3,q,573324,dohNav_GID,1787,dohNav,/33110/ 
33120/33139/.asp#6 (last visited Oct. 15, 2010) (enumerating the limited rights afforded to same-
sex couples, including the right to hospital visitation, the right to control over a partner’s remains, 
and the right to add one partner to the insurance policy of the other partner as a family member).  
 24. Because marriage and many other family status issues in Israel are controlled by religious 
authorities opposed to same-sex marriage, no law requiring recognition of same-sex marriage could 
currently be adopted in Israel. However, the Israeli courts have held that Israel must treat same-sex 
couples lawfully married in other jurisdictions as married under Israeli law. Yuval Yoaz, High 
Court: Interior Ministry Must Register Same-Sex Couples Legally Married Abroad, HAARETZ, Nov. 
22, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/high-court-interior-ministry-must-register-
same-sex-couples-legally-married-abroad-1.202009. To be sure, the Israeli court’s decision was not 
based on American conflicts principles but rather on unique principles of Israeli law. It 
demonstrates, however, that some jurisdictions have adopted this rule. 
 25. Other than those I have already discussed, no states, including the marriage-lite states, 
attach any status to same-sex marriages performed elsewhere. 
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are available for the final way in which couples could move “down” the 
scale in status by moving from a marriage-like state to a marriage-lite state 
(the marriage-like/marriage-lite conflict).  
For couples moving “up” the scale—from a marriage-lite to a marriage-
like or marriage state (the marriage-lite/marriage-like or marriage conflict), 
or from a marriage-like to a marriage state (the marriage-like/marriage 
conflict)—only two options realistically exist: either the forum state (the 
state offering a greater level of recognition) converts the relationship to the 
higher status or it refuses to accord it any status. The third option—that the 
forum state will recognize the marriage alternative from another state on its 
own terms—is, though theoretically viable, practically unrealistic. After 
all, it would be improbable and strange, both as a conflicts law matter and 
commonsensically, to require Massachusetts (a marriage state) to recognize 
a New Jersey civil union as a civil union under Massachusetts law, given 
that civil unions do not exist under Massachusetts law. To do so, 
Massachusetts would have to create a new category for foreigners 
relocating within its borders, and it is difficult (perhaps impossible) to 
identify a case in which courts or local law have required states to do 
something comparable. Thus, the realistic choices for Massachusetts are to 
treat the New Hampshire civil union either as a marriage or as nothing. 
B.  The Failure of Policy-Makers to Undertake a Proper Conflicts 
Analysis 
Some states have already begun to grapple with these conflicts. State 
policymakers have devoted the most attention to the marriage/marriage-
like conflict. 
In some states, legislatures have provided the answers to this question. 
For example, New Hampshire’s statutory scheme governing its marriage-
like alternative (before it became a marriage state) explicitly provided that 
the state would automatically treat a same-sex couple lawfully married in 
Massachusetts as having entered into a civil union under New Hampshire 
law.26 In such cases—where the legislature has explicitly resolved the legal 
question—we benefit from the clarity of the rules. That is, a couple 
interested in learning about its family status upon relocation could, with 
relative ease, obtain a straightforward answer. But while clarity is 
welcome, these statutes provide little by way of explanation. We do not 
know why these marriage-like states have adopted these rules. Further, 
statutes like this provide no guidance for policymakers in other 
jurisdictions grappling with the marriage/marriage-like/marriage-lite 
conflicts. 
Other states that have addressed the problem have done so outside of 
                                                                                                                     
 26. “A civil union or a marriage between a man and another man or a woman and another 
woman legally contracted outside of New Hampshire shall be recognized as a civil union in this 
state, provided that the relationship does not violate the prohibitions of this chapter.” N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 457-A:8 (2010) (repealed 2011). 
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the legislative process. For instance, when Connecticut legislatively 
adopted a marriage-like scheme27 (a court ruling has since required it to 
perform and recognize same-sex marriages28), its statutory provisions were 
not clear on this question. Connecticut’s marriage-like statute contained a 
provision defining marriage as “the union of one man and one woman,” 
effectively a Defense of Marriage Act formulation.29 Moreover, the 
legislature left untouched the statutes that referred to marriages in gendered 
terms, raising the possibility that Connecticut would entirely refuse to 
recognize same-sex marriages entered into in other states. However, also 
untouched was Connecticut’s longstanding presumption that “except in 
certain extreme cases, a marriage valid where the ceremony is performed is 
valid everywhere,” raising the possibility that Connecticut would recognize 
a same-sex marriage lawfully performed in Massachusetts as a marriage 
under Connecticut’s laws.30 And, of course, the fact that Connecticut 
defined marriage as between a man and a woman is not dispositive on 
whether it should accord any status at all to a same-sex couple lawfully 
married in another state. After all, it could have taken the middle approach 
and converted the marriage to Connecticut’s marriage-like alternative. As a 
result of this confusion, the state’s attorney general was tasked with issuing 
a formal opinion on the matter. The attorney general opined that 
Connecticut would not accord any status to same-sex marriages lawfully 
entered into in other states.31 
The Connecticut attorney general’s opinion—which was the first and 
(to my knowledge) still the most thoroughly argued consideration of these 
issues by a policymaker—is useful in several respects. First, like New 
Hampshire’s statutes that explicitly provided for automatic civil union 
status for a lawfully wed same-sex couple, the attorney general’s opinion 
provided clarity. Second, unlike those statutes, the opinion explained the 
attorney general’s reasoning.32 Third, the reasoning is based on principles 
from conflicts law, recognizing that the question presented is a conflicts 
question.33 Fourth, because the attorney general provided his reasoning, the 
opinion could be persuasive to policymakers in other states and could thus 
lead to some measure of uniformity. Unfortunately, though, the opinion is 
unhelpful in one crucial respect: it is deeply confused. 
The attorney general centers his analysis, properly enough, on the 
principle that Connecticut must recognize a marriage lawfully performed in 
                                                                                                                     
 27. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b-38aa to -38oo (West Supp. 2006) (repealed 2009). 
 28. Kerrigan v. Comm’r. of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 476–78 (Conn. 2008). 
 29. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38nn (West Supp. 2006) (repealed 2009). 
 30. Davis v. Davis, 175 A. 574, 575 (Conn. 1934). 
 31. Conn. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 2005-024 (2005), 2005 WL 2293060, at *3. 
 32. See id. at *1–5. 
 33. Id. at *2–5. 
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another state unless such a union violates Connecticut’s public policy.34 
However, the extent of the attorney general’s analysis of Connecticut’s 
public policy is that Connecticut defines marriage as between one man and 
one woman.35 Therefore, the attorney general concludes, the state could not 
automatically extend any rights at all to a same-sex marriage from another 
state.36 Q.E.D.37 
As I will explain in greater detail, this is not remotely what a conflicts 
analysis requires.38 This reasoning might suffice if the opinion were 
addressed to a marriage/no-recognition conflict, but the proper question to 
begin with for a marriage/marriage-like conflict is why Connecticut 
chooses to limit marriage to cross-sex couples but to give same-sex 
couples the very same rights and responsibilities under a different title—a 
question that the attorney general’s opinion never addresses. Only by 
confronting this question directly—that is, only by engaging in a proper 
conflicts analysis—could the attorney general arrive at a plausible and 
compelling approach for dealing with these conflicts. Alas, it appears that 
no policymaker has undertaken such an analysis. 
III.  THE LIMITS OF CURRENT SCHOLARLY APPROACHES 
As I have indicated, I am not the first to consider the conflicts that arise 
as a result of legal recognition of same-sex relationships. On the contrary, 
there is quite a large body of scholarly literature focusing on these issues. 
Scholarly interest in the issue began to emerge in the wake of the Hawaii 
Supreme Court’s 1993 decision in Baehr v. Lewin,39 the first decision that 
seemed to open the door for state recognition of same-sex marriage.40 
Ultimately, Hawaii amended its constitution to allow the legislature to 
restrict marriage to cross-sex couples and thus to forestall any conflicts 
questions from arising in courts;41 but before it did so, the media and legal 
scholars began to consider whether and how other states would recognize 
                                                                                                                     
 34. See Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170, 178 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002). 
 35. Conn. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 2005-024 (2005), 2005 WL 2293060, at *3–4. 
 36. Id. at *5. 
 37. Seriously. That’s all there is to the opinion. 
 38. See infra Part IV. 
 39. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
 40. See, e.g., Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and Choice-of-Law: If We Marry in 
Hawaii, Are We Still Married when We Return Home?, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1033, 1038–41 (1994); 
Deborah M. Henson, Will Same-Sex Marriages Be Recognized in Sister States?: Full Faith and 
Credit and Due Process Limitations on States’ Choice of Law Regarding the Status and Incidents 
of Homosexual Marriages Following Hawaii’s Baehr v. Lewin, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 551, 
552–53 (1994); Thomas M. Keane, Note, Aloha, Marriage? Constitutional and Choice of Law 
Arguments for Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 47 STAN. L. REV. 499, 499–500 (1995); 
Kramer, supra note 13, at 1965–67. 
 41. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (“The legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage to 
opposite-sex couples.”). 
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same-sex marriages performed in Hawaii (or any other state that adopted 
same-sex marriage).42 In the years that followed, a robust body of 
scholarship developed concerning this conflicts question. 
However, as I will argue in this Part, the two general approaches to 
these conflicts offered by scholars—what I refer to as the vertical federalist 
approach43 and the narrow horizontal federalist approach44—are 
theoretically and practically unsatisfying. More importantly, because they 
focus almost exclusively on the marriage/no-recognition conflict and draw 
from sources that speak only to that specific context, they offer little 
guidance for resolving the marriage/marriage-like/marriage-lite conflicts 
that will likely predominate in the coming years. Indeed, on these 
questions, the scholarly literature is virtually silent.  
A.  The Vertical Federalist Approach and Its Limits 
In the wake of Baehr, the first question that arose was whether the U.S. 
Constitution would compel states to recognize same-sex marriages that 
everyone anticipated (mistakenly, as it turns out) would soon be performed 
in Hawaii. Some reports suggested that the Full Faith and Credit Clause45 
would require other states to extend such recognition, regardless of any 
objections those states would have to doing so.46 According to this view, 
any conflict is easily resolved through a vertical federalist approach: the 
federal Constitution would dictate to states what they must do. 
                                                                                                                     
 42. With respect to media interest in the issue, see, for example, Tom Campbell, Perspective 
on Same-Sex Marriages; Each State Should Be Able to Make Its Own Decision; California Public 
Policy Should Be Decided by California Voters and Legislators, Not by a Judge in Hawaii, L.A. 
TIMES, July 12, 1996, at B9; Chris Casteel, Gay Nuptials Bill Sparks Stormy Capitol Debate, DAILY 
OKLAHOMAN, July 12, 1996, at A1; David Foster, Gay Couples Seek Benefit of Legal Wedlock, CHI. 
TRIB., June 6, 1996, at C8; Gays Win Hawaii Marriage Ruling; Decision May Set Off Legal Battles 
on Mainland, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 4, 1996, at N1; Jane Gross, After a Ruling, Hawaii Weighs Gay 
Marriages, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1994, at A1; Patricia G. Miller, Editorial,  No Faith or Credit?; 
Refusal to Recognize Same-Sex Marriages in Another State Could Mean Problems, PITT. POST-
GAZETTE, Dec. 21, 1996, at A11. 
 43. As I explain below, vertical federalism posits that the federal government—in this case, 
through the Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause—resolves these conflicts among states. See 
infra Part III.A. 
 44. As I explain below, the horizontal federalist approach assumes that the states are on an 
equal playing field and that they must resolve disputes individually, without resort to the federal 
government. I refer to the horizontal federalist approach in this context as narrow because, as I 
detail below, it looks at a very small subset of cases to develop a framework for resolving conflicts 
relating to same-sex relationships. Although I agree that the solution to these conflicts lies in a 
horizontal approach, I offer a much more broadly based theoretical basis that leads to some different 
conclusions. See infra Part III.B. 
 45. “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and 
judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the 
Manner in which such Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.” U.S. 
CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 46. See supra note 42. 
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But this approach was too simplistic, and quite clearly wrong, both as a 
descriptive matter and as a normative matter. Descriptively, it has never 
been held that states must recognize other states’ marriages in all 
circumstances under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Although states do 
generally recognize marriages from sister states, they have always reserved 
for themselves the right to reject those marriages that violate their own 
public policies.47 Moreover, given the intense opposition to same-sex 
marriage at the time (and today), it is nearly inconceivable that many 
federal or state courts would interpret and apply the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause in this manner. Thus, simply as a statement of the present state of 
the law and the courts, this version of the vertical federalist approach is 
readily rejected.  
This approach is also normatively and theoretically unsound. Consider 
its implications. It would mean that a state must always give preference to 
another jurisdiction’s policies over its own.48 That is, anything that 
qualifies as a “public Act[], Record[], [or] judicial Proceeding[]”49 of 
another state would trump a forum state’s own interests. In determining 
whether to recognize a marriage, the forum state’s own policies would not 
matter, whereas every other state’s would. The courts have expressly 
rejected this argument, and no legal scholar has seriously argued for it in 
this or any other context.50 
However, while this simplistic approach is easily rejected, there are 
more nuanced vertical federalist approaches to the issue. For example, 
some scholars have sought to narrow the public policy exception to the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause such that same-sex marriage does not come 
within the exception.51 The trouble is that courts are not likely to adopt this 
sort of approach, and in any case, many states have defeated it by enacting 
laws that expressly state that same-sex marriage is against the public policy 
of the state.52 
The most refined and creditable vertical federalist approach to conflicts 
arising from same-sex relationships is that of Professor Larry Kramer.53 
According to Kramer, although a forum state may reject some foreign 
marriages, it may not do so simply as a result of substantive disagreement 
as to the desirability of the particular marriage in question.54 To put it more 
starkly, Kramer argues that the public policy exception that allows states to 
decline to recognize or apply other states’ laws (including marriage status 
                                                                                                                     
 47. Kramer, supra note 13, at 1971. 
 48. Id. at 1977. 
 49. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 50. See Kramer, supra note 13, at 1977–78. 
 51. See, e.g., Henson, supra note 40, at 555. 
 52. Andrew Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages and Civil Unions: A 
Handbook for Judges, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2143, 2149 (2005). 
 53. See generally Kramer, supra note 13. 
 54. Id. at 1966–67, 1986. 
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conferred by other states) is unconstitutional.55 According to this view, a 
forum state may not reject same-sex marriages from marriage states if the 
forum state otherwise recognizes similarly situated opposite-sex marriages; 
but states may adopt choice of law rules that equally affect all foreign 
marriages.56 
For example, under the choice of law rules governing marriage 
currently accepted by most states, a forum state will generally recognize a 
foreign marriage if the marriage was lawful where it was celebrated.57 
Under this choice of law regime, if an opposite-sex couple travels from 
state A to state B solely for the purpose of getting married, state A will 
recognize the marriage. In Kramer’s view, pursuant to the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause, there can be no public policy exception to this rule.58 Thus, 
if a same-sex couple travels from state A to state B solely for the purpose of 
getting married—and specifically because state A does not perform same-
sex marriages performed within its borders—then state A must still 
recognize the marriage.59 However, state A could adopt a different 
generally-applicable choice of law rule that refuses to recognize any 
marriages in which a couple seeks to evade local laws by temporarily 
traveling to another state for the purpose of marriage.60 
It is worth noting that although I categorize this approach as an example 
of vertical federalism, it is actually a sort of hybrid approach that also 
includes an element of horizontal federalism. After all, this approach does 
not require that all states behave identically under the Constitution. Instead, 
the approach allows a state to select its own choice of law rules (a type of 
horizontal federalism) and only prohibits the state from declining to apply 
its own choice of law rules in a particular case as a result of a substantive 
rejection of another state’s policies.61 Nevertheless, I categorize this 
approach as vertically federalist because it centers on a particular reading 
of the Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause, and also because, as a 
practical matter, it would render many states’ approaches to marriage 
conflicts unconstitutional. 
This version of the vertical federalist approach to same-sex marriage 
conflicts is undoubtedly more formidable than the simplistic argument 
offered by some commentators. Still, while its implications appear 
somewhat more limited than those of the simplistic version—states 
determined not to recognize same-sex marriages could rework their choice 
of law rules to avoid doing so in some cases—it nevertheless has far-
                                                                                                                     
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 1998–99. 
 57. Id. at 1969. 
 58. Id. at 1999. 
 59. See id. 
 60. See id. 
 61. See id. at 1998. 
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reaching consequences. For one thing, a state staunchly opposed to same-
sex marriages would inevitably find itself compelled to recognize some of 
them. Specifically, while a state could rework its choice of law rules such 
that it could reject evasive same-sex marriages, there is probably no choice 
of law regime that would allow it to reject the same-sex marriages of 
couples who actually lived in marriage states, married there, and then, at 
some later time, moved to the forum state. Thus, many states opposed to 
same-sex marriage would nevertheless be compelled to recognize them in 
some instances. Furthermore, as Kramer acknowledges, entirely apart from 
the marriage context, his argument would undo a breathtakingly broad and 
robust body of doctrine and jurisprudence that arises from the public policy 
exception.62  
Of course, the mere fact that an argument has far-reaching implications 
does not discredit it. However, Kramer’s vertical federalist approach is 
ultimately unsatisfying. Normatively, it relies on a contestable claim about 
the nature and reach of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Many would argue 
that this constitutional provision includes within it a public policy 
exception and always has.63 More importantly, purely as a descriptive 
matter, it is almost certainly an argument that will not survive judicial 
review. That is, even if it is theoretically sound and persuasive, we can 
predict with relative confidence that the current U.S. Supreme Court will 
reject it. I say this for two reasons. First—and here is where the far-
reaching implications of the argument come into play—I think it is fair to 
speculate that the Court will not likely wish to so severely destabilize the 
law by undermining and undoing all of the applications of the public policy 
exception, particularly given that the public policy exception has been 
upheld for decades by every court to confront it, including the Supreme 
Court itself.64 Second, from a crassly legal realist perspective, if we believe 
that a majority of the current Court is opposed to same-sex marriage and 
would not require states to perform same-sex marriage on equal protection, 
due process, or fundamental rights grounds,65 then it seems likewise 
unlikely that those same Justices would be prepared to require recognition 
of foreign same-sex marriages on full faith and credit grounds. If, on the 
other hand, we believe that the Supreme Court is prepared to require states 
to perform same-sex marriages, then it will likely make that decision 
before it considers the conflicts question and thus renders the entire issue 
moot. If there remains any doubt as to whether Kramer’s vertical federalist 
argument would fail in court, I can only add that same-sex marriage 
                                                                                                                     
 62. See id. at 1973. 
 63. Id. at 1980. 
 64. See id. at 1977–78. 
 65. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Darren Spedale, Sit Down, Ted Olson and David Boies, 
SLATE, May 29, 2009, http://www.slate.com/id/2219252/ (arguing that the Court, as currently 
composed, is unlikely to find a right to same-sex marriage). 
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advocates have declined to use it in their litigation arsenal as a basis for 
challenging states’ refusals to recognize same-sex marriage. Perhaps they 
too view it as sure to fail, whatever its theoretical merits. 
Further, even if the vertical federalist argument might have some 
purchase in courts as a way of resolving conflicts arising from same-sex 
marriage, as a strategic matter, it is not one that same-sex marriage 
advocates should pursue. Although this view is likely controversial, I 
believe that same-sex marriage advocates have more to lose in pursuing 
this argument—even if it were to prevail—than they stand to gain. Forcing 
a state with a population overwhelmingly and adamantly opposed to same-
sex marriage to recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states 
with different political and social cultures is likely to spark a massive 
backlash against the same-sex marriage project so as to retard its steady, 
albeit slow, progress.66 (I argued in the previous paragraph that the absence 
of lawsuits built around Kramer’s arguments indicates something about 
same-sex marriage advocates’ calculations about its likelihood of success. 
It is also possible, of course, that the absence of such lawsuits can be 
explained by same-sex marriage advocates’ calculation that the potential 
success of such lawsuits could threaten the same-sex marriage project as a 
result of the backlash that it would spark.) In addition, advocates for same-
sex marriage have built their case, in part, on the back of states’ rights 
rhetoric. Indeed, they assured opponents and fence-straddlers that the 
adoption of same-sex marriage by one state would not force the hand of 
other states. Having successfully introduced same-sex marriage in a small 
number of states, it would now be unseemly, even dishonest, to use that as 
a wedge to force same-sex marriage on other states.67 
Finally, there is one dispositive reason for reaching beyond Kramer’s 
vertical federalist approach: it does not resolve all of the conflicts. At best, 
the vertical federalist approach extends to conflicts that involve recognition 
of same-sex marriage; this approach offers no guidance when it comes to 
                                                                                                                     
 66. The recent history in California and Maine may be instructive. In both states, the courts 
held that the state constitution required recognition of same-sex marriage. Almost immediately, 
however, ballot initiatives reversed these holdings. Randal C. Archibold & Abby Goodnough, 
California Voters Ban Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/ 
06/us/politics/06ballot.html; Michael Falcone, Maine Vote Repeals Gay Marriage Law, POLITICO, 
Nov. 4, 2009, available at  http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1109/29119.html. Recall that both 
California and Maine are relatively progressive states in relatively progressive regions. If the public 
outcry against same-sex marriage was powerful enough there, consider what the outcry might look 
like if a federal court in a politically conservative state were to require the state to recognize another 
state’s same-sex marriages. In the worst-case scenario, it might be enough to generate support for a 
Federal Marriage Amendment prohibiting same-sex marriage everywhere, thereby erasing whatever 
gains the movement has made thus far and severely retarding future development. Short of that, it 
would at least become a wedge issue yet again in national political elections. 
 67. I have fleshed out these arguments in a recent symposium contribution. See Hillel Y. 
Levin, Conflicts and the Shifting Landscape Around Same-Sex Relationships, 41 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 
(forthcoming 2011).  
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recognition of foreign marriage-like and marriage-lite relationships that are 
at the heart of this Article. This is because no one would argue that the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause requires one state to recognize marriage-like and 
marriage-lite relationships created in other states. If this seems less than 
intuitive, consider the following hypothetical. State A decides to give 
certain state tax benefits to computer owners. Sam, a resident of State A, 
acquires a computer and enjoys the tax benefits. Subsequently, Sam and 
her computer move to State B, a state that does not extend tax benefits to 
computer owners. Can Sam claim that the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
requires State B to offer her the same tax benefits that she enjoyed in 
State A? Obviously not. State B is free to reject the special status offered by 
State A. Similarly, a state is permitted to decline to recognize a special 
status conferred by marriage-like and marriage-lite schemes from other 
states. 
Thus, many of the conflicts that this Article seeks to resolve would 
remain unresolved under Kramer’s analysis. For instance, should a 
marriage state treat a marriage-like relationship from another state as a 
marriage, as nothing, or as something else? Should a marriage-lite state 
treat a marriage-like relationship from another state as anything? And so 
on. Thus, whatever the substantive, normative, descriptive, and strategic 
merits or demerits of the vertical federalist approach, it does not suffice. 
B.  The Narrow Horizontal Federalist Approach and Its Limits 
Recognizing that the solution to the problem initially posed in the wake 
of Baehr—must another state recognize a same-sex marriage performed in 
Hawaii?—may not lie in the Constitution, some legal scholars have 
developed a different approach. They did not have to search very far to 
locate precedent to guide them. After all, the challenge of recognition of 
same-sex relationships is not the first time that states have been confronted 
with the question of whether to recognize foreign marriages that could not 
be performed in the forum states.  
Indeed, there is a long history of states having different rules for 
marriage in this country. States have different age of consent laws, for 
example. Similarly, states differ in their consanguinity laws: some permit 
first cousins to marry while others do not. Likewise, some American 
territories and foreign countries have permitted polygamous marriages. 
And finally, of course, until Loving v. Virginia,68 some states prohibited 
interracial marriages (or at least some interracial marriages—those that 
included whites and members of any other race) while others permitted 
them. In each of these contexts, the fundamental question has been: What 
to do when a couple lawfully married in one jurisdiction and then returned, 
traveled, or moved to a state in which that marriage could not have been 
                                                                                                                     
 68. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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performed?69  
It is easy to see why scholars would turn to the doctrine that emerged 
from those contexts to resolve the conflicts arising from recognition of 
same-sex relationships: they seem to present similar questions. Based on 
cases from these contexts, scholars have developed a horizontal federalist 
model for resolving conflicts arising from same-sex relationships. In 
developing this model, scholars have begun with the principles that 
emerged from the previous marriage conflicts contexts that I have 
identified. The basic rule has been that states that prohibited a particular 
marriage also declined to recognize such marriages that had been lawfully 
created in other jurisdictions.70 This is because, generally speaking, a state 
may reject a marriage that violates its own public policy interests.71  
If this were the sum total of the cases arising from those earlier conflicts 
contexts, the application to the same-sex marriage context would be clear: 
a state with a public policy against same-sex marriage would not recognize 
a same-sex marriage lawfully performed elsewhere. But the cases, and 
therefore the scholarship, are quite a bit more complicated than that. 
Although states may reject marriages that offend their public policies, in 
some circumstances, the forum state would extend some of the “incidents” 
of marriage to these “objectionable” unions. That is, the forum state would 
recognize the couple as married for some purposes but not for others. 
These “incidents of marriage” cases are what scholars parse to develop a 
horizontal federalist approach to the conflicts arising from same-sex 
relationships. 
This approach is superior to the vertical federalist approach discussed 
above. However, it is not without its flaws. Chief among them, the 
                                                                                                                     
 69. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 40, at 1040; Henson, supra note 40, at 553. With respect to 
interracial marriages, see Wardle, supra note 6, at 1893 & n.168. To be sure, there were cases on 
both sides of this question. See Joanna L. Grossman, Fear and Loathing in Massachusetts: Same-
Sex Marriage and Some Lessons from the History of Marriage and Divorce, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 
87, 104 (2004) (explaining that while truly evasive marriages often received no recognition, courts 
sometimes recognized interracial marriages lawfully entered into in a state other than the forum if 
the couple was legitimately domiciled in that state); Koppelman, supra note 52, at 2154 n.49 
(comparing State v. Ross, 76 N.C. 242 (1877), with State v. Bell, 66 Tenn. 9 (1872)). Compare 
Miller v. Lucks, 36 So. 2d 140, 142 (Miss. 1948) (recognizing an interracial marriage for purposes 
of intestate succession when Mississippi prohibited interracial marriage), and State v. Ross, 76 N.C. 
242, 243, 247 (1877) (recognizing an interracial marriage lawfully entered into in South Carolina 
when a couple was domiciled in South Carolina and subsequently relocated to North Carolina), with 
State v. Kennedy, 76 N.C. 251, 251–53 (1877) (declining to recognize an interracial marriage 
lawfully entered into in South Carolina when the couple was never domiciled in South Carolina but 
merely married there). With respect to polygamous and consanguineous relationships, see Wardle, 
supra note 6, at 1896–1900. 
 70. See Henson, supra note 40, at 553; Wardle, supra note 6, at 1896. 
 71. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 14, at 117; Kramer,  supra note 13, at 1968–76 (describing 
that the basic doctrine is that a marriage is valid everywhere if it is valid where it is celebrated, with 
some exceptions; the primary exception being when it violates public policy). 
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incidents of marriage cases are notoriously fragmentary. As such, they do 
not readily offer a cohesive and coherent approach for determining which 
“incidents” of marriage should be recognized by the forum state and which 
should not. Scholars have struggled to make sense of these cases and to 
develop rules.72 Doing so is something like recreating a complex statutory 
scheme by referencing a small number of cases in which the statute was 
applied. Further, scholars inevitably make contestable claims about how to 
categorize cases and what to learn from them.73 Which incidents of 
marriage should a state extend to a couple and which should it not? Under 
what circumstances? Given these difficulties, few scholars have even 
attempted to offer a comprehensive scheme from these fragments. 
To be sure, there is some excellent scholarship in this area. In his book, 
Same Sex, Different States, Professor Andrew Koppelman makes a heroic 
effort to deduce rules from the incidents of marriage cases and create a 
workable framework for resolving conflicts arising from the recognition of 
same-sex marriage.74 The analysis he develops is compelling in many 
ways, but it falls prey to the problems that often beset those engaged with 
this enterprise. First, he relies on a very small set of incidents of marriage 
cases to develop his thesis. (This is no fault of his own; there are simply 
not very many cases to begin with.) Second, the cases he analyzes offer 
little by way of explanation for why they come out as they do. In this sense, 
they are paragons of formalist reasoning, announcing a rule without 
explaining the values and principles that undergird it. As a result, 
Koppelman expends a great deal of effort categorizing these cases in such 
a way as to provide a coherent framework, but the categories and lessons 
he draws are suspect because the source material is so sparse.  
Third, the framework that Koppelman offers is awfully complex. He 
concludes that “evasive marriages” (as when a couple domiciled in a no-
recognition state travels to a marriage state to get married and then returns 
to the domicile) should generally not be recognized in the domicile state.75 
In contrast, “migratory marriages” (as when a couple domiciled and 
married in a marriage state subsequently relocates to a no-recognition state) 
should not be recognized, with several exceptions and exceptions to 
exceptions.76 Next, “visitor marriages” (as when a couple domiciled in a 
marriage state travels to a no-recognition state) should always be 
recognized.77 Finally, “extraterritorial marriages” (as when a couple 
domiciled and married in a marriage state has never been to the no-
recognition forum state, but the marriage is “relevant to litigation 
                                                                                                                     
 72. See supra note 5. 
 73. Id. 
 74. KOPPELMAN, supra note 14, at 91–96. 
 75. Id. at 102–06. 
 76. Id. at 106–10. 
 77. Id. at 110–12. 
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conducted there”) should also always be recognized.78 The existence of so 
many categories, with different rules applying to each, is daunting enough. 
But beyond that, the framework, with its exceptions and exceptions to 
exceptions, is particularly difficult to administer. For example, it would 
require a court to determine whether a couple relocates for evasive 
purposes or for migratory purposes—a determination that Koppelman 
agrees is sometimes difficult and contestable.79 To be sure, difficulty of 
administration and inherent uncertainty are not alone sufficient reason to 
reject a proposal that is otherwise compelling, but they are surely worthy of 
consideration in determining whether a proposal is optimal. 
Moreover, although Koppelman’s approach represents the best of the 
scholarship that focuses on the incidents of marriage framework, its 
application to the marriage/marriage-like/marriage-lite conflicts at the heart 
of this Article is, at best, unclear. Beyond remarking offhandedly that “[i]n 
[marriage-like] states, foreign same-sex marriages ought to be simply 
treated as if they were [the local marriage-like alternative],” Koppelman 
has little to say on the matter.80 He offers no explanation for why this rule 
should apply with respect to the marriage/marriage-like conflict, even 
while noting that several marriage-like states reject this approach;81 and he 
does not even broach the marriage-like/marriage conflict or any conflict 
patterns involving marriage-lite states. Thus, it is not clear how this 
horizontal federalist approach would translate to the marriage/marriage-
like/marriage-lite conflicts context. 
The lack of focus on these conflicts in the horizontal federalist literature 
is likely a direct result of the literature’s near-exclusive focus on the 
incidents of marriage cases. The incidents of marriage cases, after all, arose 
from marriage/no-recognition conflicts. That is, the conflicting laws that 
triggered those lawsuits either permitted or prohibited the marriages in 
question; they provided no intermediate marriage alternatives for the 
couples in question. As a result, the doctrinal framework for resolving 
those cases was fairly straightforward: first, determine whether the forum 
state’s prohibition of such marriages constituted a public policy objection, 
and second, if so, consider whether the right sought by the couple was, 
nevertheless, an incident of marriage that could be separated from the 
marriage itself. As Koppelman and others argue, this may transfer easily to 
marriage/no-recognition conflict in the context of same-sex relationships. 
But the danger in adopting such a narrow approach is that it leaves all of 
the newer conflicts questions unresolved. 
One natural response to these observations might be, “Fine, I get it. The 
current scholarship does not adequately or neatly translate the incidents of 
                                                                                                                     
 78. Id. at 112. 
 79. Id. at 106. 
 80. Id. at 108. 
 81. Id. 
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marriage doctrines to the marriage/marriage-like/marriage-lite conflicts 
context. So do it. Go back and interrogate the incidents of marriage cases 
and report back what they have to say about these newer conflicts 
patterns.” The trouble is that the incidents of marriage cases are too limited 
to withstand that type of interrogation. I mean this in two senses. First, my 
comment above about the inherent contestability of the principles that 
emerge from these cases for resolving marriage/no-recognition conflicts in 
the context of same-sex relationships applies doubly (at least) if we try to 
stretch these principles to resolve other conflicts patterns. That is, the cases 
are too few, too inconsistent, and too thinly reasoned to offer much 
guidance.  
Second, and most importantly, the marriage/marriage-like/marriage-lite 
conflicts questions are fundamentally different from the marriage/no-
recognition conflicts question. With respect to the latter, it is not difficult 
to appreciate that a state’s utter rejection of marriage (be it an interracial, 
consanguineous, polygamous, or same-sex marriage) is a strong indication 
of an objection on the part of that state to the relationship underlying the 
marriage. Thus, the predominant rule that forum states that do not permit 
these marriages will generally reject them makes some intuitive sense. But 
a marriage-like or marriage-lite state that allows same-sex couples all or 
some of the rights and responsibilities traditionally associated with 
marriage, even as it withholds the title marriage and perhaps many of the 
other rights and responsibilities that typically come with marriage, is a 
different thing. The incidents of marriage cases, narrowly focused as they 
are on marriage/no-recognition conflicts, shine little light on these cases. 
For all of these reasons, the resolution of the marriage/marriage-
like/marriage-lite conflicts lies not in a narrow horizontal federalist 
approach that focuses nearly exclusively on the incidents of marriages 
cases but rather in a broader horizontal federalist approach that looks to 
basic conflicts principles to confront these questions. 
IV.  A NEW APPROACH 
In this Part, I develop a new approach for resolving the 
marriage/marriage-like/marriage-lite conflicts. My approach views 
conflicts through a horizontal federalist lens but provides a broader 
theoretical framework that is more sensitive and responsive to conflicts 
doctrine and theory, as well as to the various marriage alternatives now 
offered by states, than are the current models. 
Conflicts doctrine deals with the sort of conflicts pattern presented by 
the marriage/marriage-like/marriage-lite conflicts in several areas across 
the law. I do not refer here to the parallel marriage/no-recognition conflicts 
arising from different laws regarding interracial marriage, consanguinity, 
and so forth. As we have seen, those cases are too limited to serve as the 
template for resolving the newer conflicts. Rather, I refer to a different sort 
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of conflict pattern entirely—namely, the case in which a forum state 
refuses to recognize some aspects of a legal status recognized and 
conferred by a foreign state but chooses to recognize others. In such cases, 
the question arises as to whether the forum state will recognize the status 
conferred by the foreign state, reject it altogether, or alter the foreign status 
such that it would conform to the forum state’s law. This, of course, is the 
marriage/marriage-like/marriage-lite pattern, and by expanding the scope 
of the inquiry beyond the marriage/no-recognition conflicts of the past, we 
find that states routinely (but not always) adopt the third option, of altering 
the foreign status in order to conform it to local law.  
I begin this Part by offering three examples of how conflicts law 
resolves this conflicts pattern: one from contracts law and two from family 
law. After doing so, I show that this general approach, although it has no 
formal name in American conflicts law, mirrors a French conflicts doctrine 
called Equivalence. I then argue that the Equivalence concept fits 
comfortably within American family law conflicts doctrine, and I show 
how it would resolve the marriage/marriage-like/marriage-lite conflicts. 
Finally, I show how this approach fits with contemporary conflicts 
doctrine.  
A.  Three Examples of the Pattern 
1.  Severability of Unenforceable Contracts Clauses 
Parties sometimes enter into a contract in a foreign state that contains a 
clause that a forum state adjudicating the contract deems unenforceable. In 
such a case, the question arises as to how the forum state should treat the 
rest of the contract. Should the state (1) put aside its objections to the 
problematic clause on the grounds that it should give full force to a sister 
state’s law; (2) reject the contract entirely; or (3) sever the unenforceable 
clause and give full force to what is left of the contract? For example, 
consider the following case. X and Y enter into a contract in state A. The 
contract contains a clause in which Y waives certain statutory rights. The 
clause is lawful in state A. However, suppose that litigation ensues in state 
B, where the waiver clause is void as against public policy. What should 
state B do? 
Indeed, this pattern arises with some frequency in contracts cases. And, 
truth be told, it is not limited to foreign versus forum law conflicts. For 
example, suppose that two parties enter into an employment contract in 
state A, where X agrees to work for Y. Suppose further that the employment 
contract includes a non-compete provision in the event that the 
employment relationship is terminated. But suppose that the non-compete 
provision contains work restrictions that are too broad and would render 
the provision unenforceable under state A’s law. In the event of litigation 
concerning the employment relationship, how should state A view the 
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contract as a whole? 
In such cases, the court will often sever the unenforceable provision 
such that the remainder of the contract will be valid and enforceable.82 
Thus, a contract provision void in the forum state does not always void an 
entire contract.83 Similarly, an employment contract that contains an 
unenforceable non-compete clause is generally valid, except with respect to 
the non-compete clause itself.84 In other words, the court will conform the 
contract, where possible, to local law and policy. In so doing, it can uphold 
its interest in enforcing agreements between parties while simultaneously 
affirming its opposition to the particular provision in question.85 
2.  Different Contents of the Marriage Relationship 
This conflicts pattern—and resolution—is also found within family law 
itself. The states vary somewhat with regard to precisely which rights 
travel along with marriage. Some states are community property states86 
while others are common law states.87 If a couple were to move from the 
                                                                                                                     
 82. See 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 318 (2004) (“If any part of such an agreement is valid, 
it will avail pro tanto, though another part may be prohibited by statute, provided: (1) the statute 
does not, either expressly or by necessary implication, render the whole void; and (2) the sound part 
can be separated from the unsound and enforced without injustice to the defendant. Under some 
holdings, a court may modify a contract to comport with the requirements of a statute applicable to 
the agreement or may reform a contract to eliminate any unconscionable provisions or terms that 
violate public policy.”); see also 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 297 (1999) (“A lawful promise based on a 
good consideration is not invalid because an unlawful promise is made for the same consideration, 
and where the illegal portions of an agreement are severable, they will be upheld. . . . If the illegal 
part can be eliminated without destroying the symmetry of the contract as a whole, this will be 
done, and the remainder enforced. . . . Thus, the fact that one part of an agreement may be void or 
unenforceable does not render the entire agreement void, if the prohibited and valid provisions are 
severable, and if the parties would have entered the bargain absent the illegal portion of the original 
agreement. In order to avoid inequities, courts will sever the illegal and unenforceable provisions of 
a contract from the remainder rather than declare the entire contract void.”). 
 83. See 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 297 (1999) (“Except in cases of fundamental 
interdependency, a contract is not rendered unenforceable because it contains an invalid clause 
relating to arbitration.”). 
 84. See, e.g., Ex parte Crisona, 743 So. 2d 452, 455 (Ala. 1999); Pierce v. Hand, Arendall, 
Bedsole, Greaves & Johnston, 678 So. 2d 765, 767 (Ala. 1996). 
 85. I do not mean to imply, of course, that conflicts law governing contracts and conflicts law 
governing family status are identical. Further, as a general matter, family status is more 
consequential than contractual provisions. I offer this example only as a useful analogy to show that 
conflicts doctrine allows for flexibility in order to serve the interests of the relevant parties and the 
relevant states. 
 86. A community property state is one in which property acquired during a marriage is 
considered to be owned by both spouses. Community property states in the United States include 
Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, and several others. Lee Ann 
Sontheimer Murphy & Tiffany Knight, The Ins and Outs of Community Property Law, 
LEGALZOOM.COM (June 2006), http://www.legalzoom.com/marriage-divorce-family-law/divorce/ 
ins-and-outs. 
 87. Community Property States Versus Common Law Property States, WIGGIN & DANA LLP 
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first state to the second, the second would generally apply its own law were 
a dispute about the property to arise (though some states would recognize 
the status of the property bestowed by the other state)—but it would still 
recognize the couple as married.88  
In other words, the mere fact that the forum state might not recognize 
one aspect of the relationship is not enough for the state to refuse 
recognition of the relationship altogether. Once again, we find the forum 
state rejecting that which conflicts with its policies and embracing that 
which it can. 
3.  The Incidents of Marriage Cases 
As I have argued, the specific case holdings in earlier marriage/no-
recognition conflicts shed little light on the marriage/marriage-
like/marriage-lite problems. However, one can see that the conflicts 
principles I have described are implicitly at play in some of those very 
cases.89 Sometimes, when courts have been confronted with conflicts 
arising from polygamous, consanguineous, and interracial marriages, they 
have held that, although the no-recognition state has an interest in rejecting 
the marriage, it might nevertheless have an interest in recognizing aspects 
of the marriage, the “incidents” of marriage.90 For instance, although a no-
recognition state might find a polygamous marriage abhorrent, it might 
nevertheless prefer to enforce an alimony decree from a foreign state that 
assumes a marriage relationship—because the forum state has no interest 
in becoming a haven for foreign debtors fleeing court decrees—rather than 
to refuse to accord any status whatsoever to the relationship.91 In this way, 
the forum state adjusts its laws so as to minimize conflicts where possible; 
but when true conflicts are unavoidable, they reject the foreign state’s law.  
Consider also the famous In re Dalip Singh Bir’s Estate case.92 There, 
an Indian national with a California bank account and two wives in India 
                                                                                                                     
(Nov. 1, 2000), http://www.wiggin.com/showadvisory.aspx?show=5622. 
 88. Id. Either of these approaches is consistent with the Equivalence approach. If a forum 
community property state chooses to treat property acquired in a common law regime as separate 
property, then it is choosing to modify its own laws slightly so as to conform to the couple’s 
expectations and mirror what the couple had previously undertaken in the other forum. If it chooses 
to treat it as quasi-community property, then the forum is choosing to apply its own laws to the 
couple’s property, modifying them only slightly, without entirely rejecting the relationship. In any 
event, the key point is that in all cases, the forum state recognizes the couple as married, even 
though the marriage they had entered into may have included slightly different rights and 
responsibilities. 
 89. See KOPPELMAN,  supra note 14, at 15–20, 82–96; Henson, supra note 40, at 564–66, 
581–83 (comparing the public policies behind the same-sex “incidents” of marriage debate to those 
of the polygamous “incidents” cases). 
 90. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 14, at 91–95. 
 91. See id. 
 92. 188 P.2d 499 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948). 
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died intestate in California.93 The court held that a polygamous marriage 
could be valid in California for the purposes of succession even though 
California would reject the marriage for other purposes (for instance, 
cohabitation).94 In other words, the court unbundled the term “marriage” 
and applied those elements of the marriage that were compatible with local 
law and not those that were abhorrent to it. Similarly, in Estin v. Estin, the 
Supreme Court held that a forum state should recognize those aspects of a 
divorce judgment obtained in another state that are compatible with the 
forum state’s own law, even as it rejects the incompatible aspects.95 Again, 
the forum state would look beyond the title (“divorced”) conferred by the 
other state and would instead focus on the substance of the divorce decree. 
Further, the state would modify its own laws to the extent possible in order 
to avoid or minimize conflicts. 
In none of these so-called incidents of marriage (or divorce) cases does 
a court articulate much by way of reasoning; and, to be sure, there are other 
incidents cases that cannot be squared with this approach (indeed, the 
incidents cases as a whole defy synthesis and are in some ways 
incoherent).96 However, in an inchoate way, American courts view legal 
relationships, including marriage, flexibly enough that they can reject those 
aspects of the relationships that offend their own policies without rejecting 
the whole.  
B.  The French Doctrine of Equivalence 
American conflicts law is filled with many debates and much jargon. 
As a result, some straightforward concepts, like the fact that American 
courts sometimes modify legal relationships in order to conform to local 
law, are not well-articulated or clearly developed. However, a parallel 
French conflicts law doctrine called Equivalence sheds light on the 
approach that I have described. Under French law, as in American law, a 
local court will not apply foreign laws that grant rights to a holder that are 
incompatible with French policy.97 However, under the doctrine of 
                                                                                                                     
 93. Id. at 499. 
 94. Id. at 501–02. 
 95. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 549 (1948). Here, the forum state was required to treat a 
couple as divorced in the sense that they were no longer husband and wife, but it could continue to 
require the husband to comply with an alimony order that presupposed that they were still married. 
Id. at 546–49. 
 96. For a discussion of the many different approaches to these kinds of cases, see generally 
Wardle, supra note 6 (reviewing “incidents” cases involving interracial, polygamous, and same-sex 
marriages). 
 97. See BERNARD AUDIT, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ paras. 465, 802 (5th ed. 2008); see 
also Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2007: Twenty-First Annual 
Survey, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 243, 283 (2008) (“[W]ith regard to the French plaintiffs, the court 
concluded that the judgment would be recognized in France because a French court would likely 
find that . . . U.S. law would likely produce the same outcome as the law that would be applicable 
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Equivalence, France will do its best to approximate the protections and 
rights of an incompatible foreign law by applying the nearest equivalents 
under French law.98 That is, even where France would be unable to 
recognize a right or status afforded by foreign law as such, it will look to 
the underlying elements of the foreign right or status and find and apply the 
closest match available under French law.99 
An example may help to clarify this concept. In the past, France, like 
other civil law countries, did not recognize trusts.100 Theoretically, then, a 
beneficiary of a foreign trust could not claim any benefits from the trust in 
French courts. However, French courts developed the doctrine of 
Equivalence and identified and applied the French laws that best 
approximated the concept and contours of the trust. Consequently, France 
was able to apply those aspects of the foreign law that France itself did 
offer.101  
This approach has clear benefits. French interests are vindicated in two 
ways: first, by maintaining the superiority of French law in France; and 
second, by aligning its own laws, to the extent they permit, with those of 
other countries and thereby creating a relatively unified and predictable 
approach to the legal question. In other words, where the interests of two 
states align, the forum state minimizes conflicts and advances its own 
interests by finding the nearest equivalent under its own law to apply to the 
lawfully created foreign relationship or entity. It should be immediately 
obvious that this is what I have described as the basic American approach 
to conflicts. 
To be sure, American conflicts law does not necessarily take its cues 
from French law, nor should it.102 However, on this particular question, as 
we have seen, the doctrine of Equivalence is simply a more clearly-stated 
and expansive version of what American courts sometimes do with 
conflicts questions presenting this pattern, and American courts would do 
                                                                                                                     
under French choice-of-law rules (doctrine of ‘equivalence’) . . . [and] the American class action 
procedures would not contravene French public policy . . . .”). 
 98.  See YVON LOUSSOUARN & PIERRE BOUREL, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ para. 505 (6th 
ed. 1999); AUDIT, supra note 97, para. 737; see also John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of 
the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 670 (1995) (“The Hague Convention report discusses leading 
cases from . . . France . . . in which conflict-of-laws issues about trust validity were resolved by 
characterizing the Anglo-American trust in terms of the forum state’s law of contractual 
obligations.”). 
 99. See AUDIT, supra note 97, para. 737; Langbein, supra note 98, at 670.  
 100. See 4 ERNST RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 465–66 (1958). See 
generally Langbein, supra note 98 (discussing how the trust is distinctly an Anglo-American 
institution). 
 101. See AUDIT, supra note 97, para. 737; LOUSSOUARN & BOUREL, supra note 98, para. 505; 
4 RABEL, supra note 100, at 465–66.  
 102. See generally SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION: 
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE (2006) (comparing the American choice of law approach to European 
approaches). 
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well to make this explicit.103 In other words, I am not arguing that 
American courts should abandon American conflicts doctrine in favor of 
French conflicts doctrine. Rather, I am suggesting that in this particular 
case, there is substantial overlap and similarity—the French are just 
explicit about the principle at work. 
C.  Applying This Approach to the Marriage/Marriage-
Like/Marriage-Lite Conflicts Context 
By applying this approach—what the French call Equivalence and what 
we call severability in the contracts context—to the marriage/marriage-
like/marriage-lite conflicts, we can provide a straightforward framework 
for courts and states to use. 
In the marriage/marriage-like case, as I have noted, there are three 
possible approaches to the question of recognition of foreign same-sex 
marriages, and choosing among them can be translated into a conflicts 
question: should a marriage-like forum apply (1) the foreign law that 
declares the couple married, (2) the forum law that declares that a same-sex 
couple cannot be married, or (3) the forum law that declares that a same-
sex couple can enter into a relationship that gives them all of the legal 
rights of marriage? And, once again, similar possibilities apply with 
respect to the remaining conflicts patterns.104 
The basic rule, as stated previously, is that states should reject that 
which offends their public policy and accept that which conforms to it. 
Thus, for the marriage/marriage-like conflict, the forum state should refuse 
to apply the marriage label to the couple, but it should extend all of the 
benefits that it would offer to similarly situated same-sex couples under 
local law. In other words, contrary to the approaches originally taken by 
Connecticut and California,105 it should treat the couple as having 
automatically entered into its marriage-like alternative.  
The same rule should apply in the marriage/marriage-lite and marriage-
like/marriage-lite conflicts cases. That is, the marriage-lite forum state 
should not recognize the marriage or marriage-like label, or even the full 
array of rights and responsibilities that the couple attained under the 
foreign state’s marriage or marriage-like scheme. It should, however, 
                                                                                                                     
 103. Indeed, Equivalence is not entirely foreign to American courts. Narrowly speaking, 
Louisiana has adopted the doctrine of Equivalence for conflicts cases in its civil code. Article 3536 
of the Louisiana Civil Code provides that “a real right acquired while the movable was situated in 
another state is subject to the law of this state if . . . the right is incompatible with the law of this 
state . . . .” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3536 (2009). Comment (h) to this Louisiana code provision 
essentially incorporates the doctrine of Equivalence and states that “this principle should not 
prevent Louisiana courts from giving the holder of the right protection that approximates as much 
as possible the protection accorded by the law of the other state.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3536 cmt. 
h (2009). 
 104. See supra Part I–II.B. 
 105. See supra Part II. 
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extend all of the benefits that it offers to same-sex couples within its own 
marriage-lite alternative and that are subsumed within the marriage or 
marriage-like relationship into which the couple already entered.106 
Similarly, with respect to the marriage-like/marriage conflict (where a 
couple enters into a marriage-like relationship and then finds themselves in 
a marriage state), the marriage state should automatically treat the couple 
as though they were married. Once again, the marriage state would simply 
be conforming the relationship to local law. 
However, with respect to the marriage-lite/marriage-like and marriage-
lite/marriage conflicts, the marriage and marriage-like forum states should 
refuse to extend any recognition to the couple that has entered elsewhere 
into a marriage-lite relationship. This is because (1) marriage-lite 
relationships offend the policies of marriage and marriage-like states, such 
that the state should not recognize the marriage-lite status itself, and (2) the 
couple has not shown any interest in undertaking the much more robust 
marriage-like or marriage relationship. That is, the marriage-like or 
                                                                                                                     
106. To be sure, the case for automatic recognition in marriage-lite states is less clear than the 
case for automatic recognition in marriage-like states. Here’s why: in the case of severability of 
contractual provisions, courts often consider whether the parties to the contract would have entered 
into the contractual relationship in the absence of the unenforceable provision. If the unenforceable 
provision is integral to the contract relationship, then courts will not sever it, and instead will 
declare the entire contract void. See 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 318 (2004); 17A C.J.S. Contracts 
§ 297 (1999). One could argue that a marriage-lite relationship is so different in kind from a 
marriage or marriage-like relationship that one cannot assume that the couple that married in 
Massachusetts, for example, or entered into a domestic partnership in California, would have 
wanted the marriage-lite relationship; and, as such, the marriage-lite state should treat the 
relationship as void under forum law. This argument is not without force. Indeed, anecdotally, I 
have met several same-sex couples who have told me that they traveled to a marriage state and tied 
the knot for the purpose of making a political statement but had no interest in bringing that 
relationship back with them to their marriage-lite or no-recognition home states. To put it simply, 
the fact that a couple enters into a bigger-bundle relationship does not necessarily indicate that they 
would have chosen to also enter into a smaller-bundle relationship, and perhaps the smaller-bundle 
state should not foist the relationship upon them.  
In the end, this is an opt-out versus opt-in question: should couples who have married or 
entered into marriage-like relationships in foreign states be required to opt-in separately to a 
relationship in a marriage-lite state, or should they be required to explicitly opt-out if they do not 
wish to maintain such a relationship? This question can only truly be resolved with empirical data, 
but in the absence of such data, we have no choice but to rely on our intuitions. My own intuition is 
that the rights and responsibilities that come along with marriage-lite relationships, such as hospital 
visitation rights, are so basic that they should be assumed along with entry into a marriage or 
marriage-like relationship. Put otherwise, we may reasonably assume that couples who get married 
or enter into marriage-like alternatives are doing more than making a political statement that has no 
tangible consequences. 
Finally, totally apart from the framework that I am proposing, as we have seen in the incidents 
of marriage cases, same-sex couples contemplating marriage should already be aware that non-
marriage states may well recognize their relationship for some purposes, and they may do so 
unpredictably. The framework that I have proposed would make it predictable and provide an opt-
out option for such couples. 
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marriage forum cannot sever some piece of the marriage-lite relationship 
that it objects to and thus leave some larger piece that it can recognize; 
there is simply no equivalence in the relationships.107 However, there is 
one critical exception to this rule: if the marriage or marriage-like forum 
state would allow individuals to enter into a contractual relationship 
governing the specific right at issue independently of a marriage or 
marriage alternative relationship, then it should recognize the foreign 
marriage-lite relationship’s granting of that right. For instance, if the forum 
state permits individuals to appoint someone to make end-of-life decisions 
independently of marriage (as all states do), and if the foreign marriage-lite 
relationship provides for end-of-life decision-making, then the forum state 
should affirm that aspect of the relationship as a contractual matter. 
In my view, this approach is fairly intuitive and offers a more 
comprehensive and straightforward approach than those offered by others. 
But that is not to say that it will make everyone happy. Indeed, it will likely 
make very few—at least, very few partisans in the same-sex marriage 
debates—happy. Some who wish to see same-sex marriage spread 
throughout the country would no doubt prefer an argument that every state 
is required to recognize a same-sex marriage lawfully performed in another 
state, such as that offered by Professor Kramer, who argues that the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution may require such 
recognition.108 For doctrinal, practical, and strategic reasons that I have 
already discussed, I do not believe that conflicts law should be the wedge 
for expanding same-sex marriage.  
On the other side, some who oppose same-sex marriage and other forms 
of recognition may protest that my approach allows a sort of “creep” in the 
recognition of same-sex relationships, requiring states that have expressly 
rejected same-sex marriage to recognize such relationships in some cases. 
To these I argue that the approach I have offered recognizes and 
operationalizes the interests that states have expressed by refusing to 
recognize same-sex relationships. That is, such a forum state must offer 
same-sex couples from other jurisdictions no more than the forum state 
itself offers same-sex couples living within its own jurisdiction. But such a 
state ought not penalize couples from foreign states by withholding rights 
and responsibilities that it offers to same-sex couples within its borders 
simply on the grounds of form or to express nothing more than rejection of 
the word marriage. Doing so violates both comity and the forum state’s 
own interests. 
 
                                                                                                                     
107. One final point is worth clarifying. What I have offered is simply a default rule. States 
may reject this approach entirely if they do so explicitly. However, they should be very careful in 
making such a choice. For example, a marriage-like state may choose to treat a same-sex married 
couple as having no status whatsoever under local law, but if it does so, it would be undermining its 
own policies that seem to favor the creation of strong marriage-like bonds for same-sex couples. 
 108. Kramer, supra note 13, at 1976–92. 
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In any case, making people happy is not my goal, and, for reasons I 
have explained,109 I suggest that the approach I offer is the most sensible 
way to solve the problem. 
D.  The Doctrinal Lens 
Some may object to my approach on the grounds that I seem to have 
sidestepped conflicts doctrine and terminology almost entirely. However, I 
believe that the framework I have offered is fully consistent with, and 
perhaps compelled by, conflicts doctrine. In this section, I show how. 
Conflicts doctrine is notoriously jargon-filled, and the debates over the 
correct approach to conflicts problems—modern, traditional, or the Second 
Restatement—are endless. As it relates to the questions this Article is 
concerned with, however, there is little practical difference among the 
various approaches. All of them require forum states to balance their own 
interests against the interests of the other state and the interests in comity. 
They express this approach through different terminology, but the approach 
is the same. For example, both the traditional approach to conflicts, 
captured in the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws, and the approach 
captured in the Second Restatement announce that any marriage that is 
“valid where performed or celebrated [is] valid everywhere unless violative 
of the public policy of the forum.”110 Thus, under this approach, the 
question becomes what the “public policy” of the forum is with respect to 
the same-sex relationship recognized in the foreign state. The modern 
approach, by contrast, counsels something called an “interest analysis.” 
Under the interest analysis, the forum state must once again consider its 
“interests” in the relationship, as compared with those of the foreign state. 
As a practical matter, for the purposes of this question at least, a public 
policy analysis and an interest analysis are fundamentally the same. In this 
section, I refer to the interest analysis because I believe that it provides 
clearer direction for how to conduct this analysis, but a public policy 
analysis would lead to the same conclusion.  
Under the modern approach, courts use a two-step analysis for 
addressing conflicts questions. First, the forum court must analyze the 
substance of both laws and determine whether there is a true conflict 
between them.111 In its most basic formulation, a true conflict exists when 
the two laws actually lead to different results.112 If, on the other hand, both 
states’ laws would lead to the same conclusion, there is no true conflict, 
                                                                                                                     
 109. See supra Part IV.C. 
 110. L. Lynn Hogue, State Common-Law Choice-of-Law Doctrine and Same-Sex “Marriage”: 
How Will States Enforce the Public Policy Exception?, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 29, 31 (1998) 
(explaining the First and Second Restatements). 
 111. See, e.g., Berg Chilling Sys., Inc. v. Hull Corp., 435 F.3d 455, 462 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(comparing New Jersey and Pennsylvania law). 
 112. ROBERT A. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 93, at 187–88 (3d ed. 1977).  
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only a false one.113 Although the rule for determining whether a true 
conflict exists is easily stated, applying this rule sometimes requires 
additional work. In difficult cases, one must undertake an interest analysis 
to determine whether there is a true conflict. This means that one must 
analyze the purposes of the apparently competing laws and the interests 
that each state has in having its own laws apply.114 Even where there 
appears to be a conflict between the outcomes of the two states’ laws, it is 
possible that the court will find that one state has no real interest in having 
its own law apply to the case.115 Because “[e]ach state restricts its laws to 
cases it really cares about and thereby minimizes conflicts,”116 if a state’s 
real interests are not implicated, then there is no true conflict.117 Finally, 
states sometimes adjust their own laws in ways that minimize conflicts.118 
Second, once the court identifies the conflict as true or false, it moves 
on to the next stage of the analysis. In the case of a false conflict, the forum 
state court can resolve the case without choosing one state’s interests and 
policies at the expense of the other’s.119 If there is a true conflict, the court 
must choose one state’s approach over the other’s.120 There is a great deal 
                                                                                                                     
 113. “‘[F]alse conflict’ really means ‘no conflict of laws.’ If the laws of both states relevant to 
the set of facts are the same, or would produce the same decision in the lawsuit, there is no real 
conflict between them . . . .” LEFLAR, supra note 112, § 93, at 188; see also EUGENE F. SCOLES & 
PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2.6 (1982) (“A ‘false conflict’ exists when the potentially 
applicable laws do not differ . . . .”). But see Hammersmith v. TIG Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 220, 229 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (“Our review of the case law indicates there is some inconsistency in the way . . . courts 
have defined a false conflict. One line of cases provides that a false conflict exists if there are no 
relevant differences between the laws of the two states, or the laws would produce the same result. 
If there is a false conflict under this definition, the court does not have to engage in a choice of law 
analysis, and may refer to the states’ laws interchangeably. . . . A different line of cases holds that a 
‘false conflict’ exists if only one jurisdiction’s governmental interests would be impaired by the 
application of the other jurisdiction’s laws.” (citations omitted)). To be sure, there is some 
inconsistency between these two approaches, and I do not mean to suggest that they necessarily lead 
to the same conclusions in most cases. However, as we will see, in our context, the distinctions 
between these two approaches are without a practical difference. 
 114. KOPPELMAN, supra note 14, at 15–16, 51–52. 
 115. See, e.g., Linda Silberman, Same-Sex Marriage: Refining the Conflict of Laws Analysis, 
153 U. PA. L. REV. 2195, 2199 & n.18 (2005) (noting that Massachusetts’s interest in attracting in-
state marriages to bolster the state’s hotel and catering industries does not constitute a legitimate 
interest). 
 116. DAVID P. CURRIE ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES—COMMENTS—QUESTIONS 63 (7th ed. 
2006). 
 117. See Silberman, supra note 115, at 2198–99, 2199 n.18 (concluding that since 
Massachusetts’s interest in having its own laws apply is insufficient and since the married same-sex 
couple at issue resided in Pennsylvania before and after the wedding, Pennsylvania laws should 
apply). 
 118. KOPPELMAN, supra note 14, at 51–52 (explaining that courts “try to discern the legitimate 
interest each state has in applying its own law, and then they try to decide the dispute before them in 
a way that accommodates all of those interests to the greatest extent feasible”). 
 119. Id. at 15–20, 51–52. 
 120. See CURRIE ET AL., supra note 116, at 174–204. 
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of disagreement among scholars and courts as to precisely how to do so, 
but there is general agreement that in many true conflicts cases, the forum 
court must refuse to apply the other state’s laws in order to advance the 
forum state’s interests.121 
And so, in applying the modern approach to marriage conflicts, we 
begin with the first step and ask if there is a true conflict between marriage, 
marriage-like, and marriage-lite states. This depends, in part, on precisely 
how we define our terms. There is a conflict, for example, between the 
terms “married” and “not married”; they obviously cannot be reconciled. 
Further, if we look beyond the formal titles that states give to these 
relationships to the underlying rights and responsibilities states bestow, 
there may still be a conflict in the sense that it is not immediately clear 
what triggers the attachment of those rights and responsibilities. Take, for 
example, the marriage/marriage-like conflict. The forum state, which 
rejects same-sex marriage but offers an alternative with similar rights and 
responsibilities, has two different laws that might apply to the couple 
married elsewhere. One law would be the “no recognition” law that would 
effectively treat them as strangers to each other. Applying this law would 
obviously create a true conflict. The second law, though, would be the 
marriage-like law that would bestow the rights and responsibilities of 
marriage, albeit without the name. Applying this law would render the 
conflict false, because, titles aside, the couple would have the same 
substantive rights and responsibilities in both jurisdictions. Therefore, in 
order to determine whether there is or is not a true conflict, we must 
undertake an interest analysis. 
This, too, is not an uncomplicated undertaking. On the one hand, these 
marriage-like and marriage-lite states have a policy against same-sex 
marriage. On the other hand, the adoption of a marriage alternative 
suggests that, whatever its reason for rejecting same-sex marriage, the state 
has a policy in favor of providing same-sex couples with some or all of the 
rights and responsibilities typically associated with marriage. Accordingly, 
to determine the state’s real policy interests, we must address the much 
more basic and loaded questions of (a) what state interests are furthered by 
marriage and (b) what interests are furthered by extending some or all of 
the rights of marriage to same-sex couples but not calling it a marriage? 
Or, to put it more simply, why—and why not—marriage? 
This “why marriage” question is undeniably subject to intense debate. 
Suggested answers include: to establish bonds of kinship among potential 
rivals;122 to enforce and make use of a gendered division of labor;123 to 
                                                                                                                     
 121. See id. 
 122. By this, I mean marriage between scions of different dynasties, with the marriage serving 
the function of unifying kingdoms and/or decreasing tension among potential rivals. 
 123. See SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON: A READER 36–37 (Andrew Sullivan ed., 1997) 
(comparing opposite-sex marriage to same-sex marriage). 
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comply with God’s law or to otherwise make God happy;124 to rein in male 
sexuality;125 to control female sexuality;126 to create a family unit capable 
of naturally bearing children;127 or to create units in which one spouse is 
responsible to and for the other, thereby reducing the responsibility of 
society at large.128 Choosing among these deeply contested visions of 
marriage is complex to say the least, and this “why marriage” question is 
what the litigation surrounding intrastate recognition of same-sex marriage 
reduces to, and courts are sharply divided.129  
As a brief aside, this may be among the most surprising and interesting 
aspects of the conflicts issue: even as the context changes, the analysis 
reduces, in fundamental ways, to the very same question that dominates the 
debate over the substantive issue, internal to each state, of whether to allow 
same-sex couples to marry. There is, however, one difference that strikes 
me as significant. The public may understand these debates relatively 
easily when they are wrapped in the fairly accessible and well-known legal 
and constitutional concepts of equality and fundamental rights, but they are 
more difficult to locate within the technical jargon that constitutes conflicts 
law. That is, terms like “the Full Faith and Credit Clause,” “public policy 
exceptions,” “true” and “false” conflicts, “comity,” and “interest analysis” 
may well obscure the underlying questions. This may mean that the public 
                                                                                                                     
 124. I do not think it is controversial to say that some view marriage as primarily a religious 
institution. See Peter Sprigg, “One Flesh”: A Sample Sermon Outline, FAM. RES. COUNCIL, 
http://www.frc.org/get.cfm?i=WX06E13&f=WX06E07 (last visited Oct. 16, 2010) (asserting that 
marriage is “created by God” and symbolizes the relationship between God and the people of Israel 
and between Christ and the Church). 
 125. JONATHAN RAUCH, GAY MARRIAGE: WHY IT IS GOOD FOR GAYS, GOOD FOR STRAIGHTS, 
AND GOOD FOR AMERICA 140 (2004). 
 126. Sam Schulman, The Worst Thing About Gay Marriage: It Isn’t Going to Work, WEEKLY 
STANDARD, June 1, 2009, http://weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/016/533nar 
ty.asp?pg=2 (“It is that marriage is concerned above all with female sexuality. The very existence of 
kinship depends on the protection of females from rape, degradation, and concubinage. This is why 
marriage between men and women has been necessary in virtually every society ever known. 
Marriage, whatever its particular manifestation in a particular culture or epoch, is essentially about 
who may and who may not have sexual access to a woman when she becomes an adult, and is also 
about how her adulthood—and sexual accessibility—is defined.”). 
 127. See Sprigg, supra note 124 (“That reproduction of the human race is one of the central 
purposes of marriage is clear from God’s mandate to Adam and Eve in Genesis 1: ‘So God created 
man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them. God 
blessed them and said to them, “Be fruitful and increase in number; fill the earth and subdue it.”’ 
For the human race to ‘be fruitful and increase in number,’ it was clearly necessary that man and 
woman come together in a procreative act.”). 
 128. RAUCH, supra note 125, at 33. 
 129. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003) (holding 
that civil marriage is not a religious institution but rather one that encourages stable relationships 
and private individual care rather than societal care of individuals); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 
N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006) (concluding that the purpose of marriage is procreation and stable 
childrearing). 
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will be less caught up in conflicts cases than it has been in the intrastate-
recognition cases and will cede these debates to lawyers and judges, an 
intuition supported by the relative paucity of public interest that has 
greeted the few conflicts cases that have arisen thus far. Whether to view 
this as a good thing or not, of course, depends on whether one believes that 
public engagement on these kinds of issues is desirable or a distraction. In 
either case, we will continue to rehash the same debates even as the legal 
terrain shifts.130 
Happily, in the context of the marriage/marriage-like conflicts, this 
fundamental “why marriage” question is answered, to the extent necessary, 
fairly readily. Whatever state interests are served by marriage, the 
marriage-like alternatives serve the same interests. If marriage establishes 
                                                                                                                     
 130. Perhaps we should not be particularly surprised that this question persists. Long before 
same-sex marriage was ever up for debate, we were having quite similar debates in other contexts. 
Most obviously, battles over gender equality revolved around related questions. For instance, 
litigation and legislative action concerning gender equality in the workplace, divorce law, and 
marital property were all fundamentally about what we mean by equality, what the purpose of 
marriage is, how women are similar to, and different from, men, and so forth. In fact, in important 
ways, same-sex marriage and other gay rights issues are simply the apex of the gender equality 
debates. To put it starkly, if we are committed to eradicating legally enforced gender roles, then why 
would we not do so in the context of marriage? Given the long history of intense debate over these 
issues, it should come as no shock that these questions persist, albeit with different points of 
emphasis, as we continue to hash out our approach to same-sex relationships. 
One might go so far as to predict that these very same issues will continue to arise in yet other 
contexts in the future. Consider the issue of polyamorous marriage. Obviously, advocates of 
recognition of polyamorous relationships will argue that the same-sex rights cases provide support 
for, or even mandate, such recognition. In fact, not only will they do so, they have already begun to 
lay the groundwork for it, and we can expect to see cases featuring such claims in coming years. See 
Beyond Same-Sex Marriage: A New Strategic Vision for All Our Families and Relationships: 
Executive Summary, BEYONDMARRIAGE.ORG, http://www.beyondmarriage.org (last visited Oct. 16, 
2010) (calling for a reformation same-sex marriage debate into a debate about “household 
diversity,” a term that encompasses polyamorous relationships). To be sure, Justice Antonin 
Scalia’s claim, echoed by many religious and cultural conservatives (and perhaps some liberals as 
well), that recognition of same-sex relationships will inevitably, and legally must, lead to 
recognition of polyamorous relationships is absurd. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 
(2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The claim is absurd as a legal matter because surely we can 
distinguish between a law that discriminates on the basis of gender (a protected class under clearly 
established case law) and a law that discriminates on the basis of the number of people a person 
wishes to marry. It is equally absurd as a predictive matter because the coalition that has coalesced 
around marriage equality for same-sex couples will surely fragment over the question of 
polyamorous marriage. Still, these inevitable cases will continue to focus on familiar questions: 
“what do we mean by equality?”; “what is the purpose of marriage?”; “in what ways are 
polyamorous groups similar to, and/or different from, married couples?”; and so forth. 
For those interested in considering the relationship between gay rights and gender equality 
further, Professor Koppelman has written extensively on the subject. See generally Andrew 
Koppelman, Defending the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Reply to 
Edward Stein, 49 UCLA L. REV. 519 (2001); Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against 
Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994); Andrew Koppelman, 
Note, The Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145 (1988). 
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bonds of kinship among potentially rival clans, then marriage-like 
alternatives do the same. If marriage reins in sexuality, then marriage-like 
alternatives would likely serve the same interest. If marriage creates stable 
family units within which to raise children, then marriage-like alternatives 
serve the same interests. If marriage creates units in which one spouse is 
responsible to and for the other, thereby reducing the responsibility of 
society at large, then marriage-like alternatives serve the same interest.131  
Of course, to the extent that marriage serves to enforce and makes use 
of gendered division of labor, then marriage-like alternatives not only do 
not serve this interest, they actually undermine it. Nevertheless, if this were 
the state’s interest in marriage, marriage would surely be 
unconstitutional,132 and the same would be true if the state articulated some 
religious interest in marriage.133 
The next question, then, is this: If marriage and the marriage-like 
alternative serve the same interest, then what interest is served in offering 
one to cross-sex couples and one to same-sex couples? Professor 
Koppelman argues that marriage has both an administrative component 
and a normative component.134 The administrative, or utilitarian, 
component, relates to the couple’s internal relationship and its lawful 
relationship to the state and everyone else.135 This component includes 
each and every aspect of marriage other than the label itself. The normative 
component relates to the social value associated with being in a 
relationship called marriage.136 A marriage-like state has apparently chosen 
to offer the administrative/utilitarian aspects of marriage to same-sex 
                                                                                                                     
 131. It is not my concern in this context which of these interests is actually advanced by 
marriage and marriage-like alternatives. It is sufficient to recognize that whatever interests are 
advanced by one are also advanced by the other. For my own part, however, I find the “mutual 
responsibility” interest, described by journalist Jonathan Rauch, the most descriptively and 
normatively compelling. RAUCH, supra note 125, at 25–27. 
 132. Laws that apply and enforce gender roles fail the intermediate scrutiny test and are 
therefore unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. See United States v. Virginia, 518 
U.S. 515, 533–34 (1996) (“‘Inherent differences’ between men and women, we have come to 
appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but not for denigration of the members of either sex or for 
artificial constraints on an individual’s opportunity. Sex classifications may be used to compensate 
women ‘for particular economic disabilities [they have] suffered,’ to ‘promot[e] equal employment 
opportunity,’ to advance full development of the talent and capacities of our Nation’s people. But 
such classifications may not be used, as they once were, to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and 
economic inferiority of women.” (citations omitted)). 
 133. A law that is designed to serve and advance religious interests, particularly where those 
interests are sectarian in nature, is unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause. See Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (“First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; 
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; 
finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’” (citations 
omitted)). 
 134. KOPPELMAN, supra note 14, at 53–58. 
 135. Id. at 55–56. 
 136. Id. at 53–54. 
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couples but not the normative aspects. I think that this is accurate enough, 
but it is a very lawyerly way of saying that marriage-like alternatives are 
the products of messy political bargains wherein the state recognizes the 
practical benefits of providing the rights and responsibilities of marriage to 
same-sex couples without deeming it as good as cross-sex marriage. Or, to 
be more generous, the differences between marriage and marriage-like are 
cultural rather than strictly legal. In other words, a state’s interest in 
offering a marriage-like alternative is functionally identical to the state’s 
interest in offering marriage to cross-sex couples while preserving the 
message that same-sex coupling is not as good as cross-sex coupling. 
Therefore, excepting the normative element associated with the term 
marriage, there is no true conflict between marriage and marriage-like 
relationships. 
Identifying the relationship between marriage-lite and marriage or 
marriage-like states is a somewhat more complex task. On the one hand, a 
marriage-lite state plainly does not take the position that same-sex 
relationships serve the same utilitarian function as cross-sex couples do. 
(After all, it offers far fewer incentives—and rights and responsibilities—
to same-sex couples.) On the other hand, marriage-lite benefits plainly 
serve some state interests. Given that the “incidents” offered in marriage-
lite bundles may include inheritance rights, workers’ compensation, the 
right to sue for wrongful death, health insurance and pension benefits for 
state employees, hospital visitation, and healthcare decision-making,137 it is 
safe to say that God, children, and gender roles are out of the picture as 
providing the basis for recognizing these relationships. After all, no one 
seriously asserts that God cares much about these incidents of marriage, 
and many of the rights and responsibilities that come along with marriage 
have little or nothing to do with children or gender stereotypes and roles. 
Instead, the interests served by these relationships must be to encourage 
mutual responsibility, to create stable, monogamous relationships, and/or 
to make it easier for committed couples to enter into private contractual 
relationships. Thus, when it comes to these specific incidents, the same 
interests are advanced for marriage, marriage-like, and marriage-lite states, 
and there is no true conflict.  
At the same time, we must also acknowledge that marriage and 
marriage-like states have an interest in rejecting these marriage-lite 
relationships. After all, when a marriage or marriage-like state wishes to 
grant rights and responsibilities typically associated with marriage, it does 
so only when the couple is willing to take on a complete marriage or 
marriage-like package. The state apparently has no interest in making it 
easy for couples to enter and exit these marriage-lite relationships, but 
rather seeks to create even stronger bonds.138 Moreover, there is no reason 
                                                                                                                     
 137. See supra note 5. 
 138. See RAUCH, supra note 125, at 41–43. 
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to assume that the couple that entered into the marriage-lite relationship 
would have chosen to marry or to enter into a marriage-like relationship 
even if those choices were available to them. It would be problematic for 
the forum state to foist that relationship upon them. Thus, when a couple 
moves from a marriage or marriage-like state to a marriage-lite state, the 
latter state’s interest does not conflict with the former’s with respect to 
those incidents of marriage that they both offer. But when a couple moves 
from a marriage-lite state to a marriage or marriage-like state,  there is a 
true conflict because the marriage or marriage-like relationship creates and 
imposes rights and responsibilities that the couple has not accepted. 
Moreover, a conflict exists because the marriage or marriage-like state 
declines to recognize relationships that do not include all of the rights and 
responsibilities typically associated with marriage. However, it is critical to 
note that with respect to those elements of a marriage-lite relationship that 
the marriage or marriage-like state would allow individuals to adopt 
independently of marriage or the marriage alternative, there is no conflict. 
Given that many of the apparent conflicts (marriage/marriage-like and 
its reverse, and marriage or marriage-like/marriage-lite, at least with 
respect to those incidents that they both offer) are actually false conflicts 
(because the states’ interests and practical treatment of the couple are not 
really at odds), the next step is to determine how best to bring these 
interests in line with one another. With respect to the remaining true 
conflicts (marriage-lite/marriage or marriage-lite/marriage-like), we must 
also consider how best to resolve them. 
 Based on this interest analysis, resolving the false conflicts becomes 
relatively easy, while resolving the remaining true conflicts is only 
somewhat more difficult. A forum state should recognize a same-sex 
relationship lawfully created in another state to the extent that doing so 
advances the forum state’s own policy interests. Where the policy interests 
are at odds, the forum state should apply its own policies in order to 
advance its own interests. 
1.  The False Conflicts 
 The false conflicts, again, are those in which the forum state and 
foreign state have fundamentally compatible policy interests.139 These false 
conflicts include the marriage/marriage-like conflict (a couple married in a 
marriage state moves to a marriage-like state); the marriage-like/marriage 
conflict (the reverse); and the marriage or marriage-like/marriage-lite 
conflict (a married or unioned couple moves from a marriage or marriage-
like state to a marriage-lite state). In these cases, the way forward is clear. 
Take first the marriage/marriage-like conflict. On the one hand, it 
makes no sense to adopt the Connecticut attorney general’s approach to 
marriage/marriage-like conflicts. Doing so advances no state’s interests—
                                                                                                                     
 139. See Kramer, supra note 13, at 1976–78. 
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and in fact considerably undermines the forum state’s interests. Consider 
the practical implications of the attorney general’s approach. A same-sex 
couple marries in Massachusetts and then relocates to Connecticut. Under 
the attorney general’s view, the state would not allow one to make end-of-
life decisions for, or inherit from, the other—even though Connecticut 
adopted a marriage-like alternative for precisely this purpose. Even more 
bizarrely, one spouse would apparently be permitted to lawfully enter into 
a civil union with another member of the same sex or marry another 
individual of the opposite sex without first dissolving the Massachusetts 
marriage.140 This greatly undermines Connecticut’s interests in creating 
stable, mutually-responsible, monogamous same-sex couples that it 
expressed by adopting its marriage-like alternative.  
On the other hand, it makes little sense for marriage-like states to 
recognize same-sex marriages from marriage states as marriages under 
local law. This would undermine the marriage-like state’s clearly-
expressed interest in withholding the normative aspect of marriage—or, as 
I put it more crassly, its interest in preserving the message that same-sex 
coupling is not as good as cross-sex coupling—from same-sex couples. It 
would also either give citizens living in other states advantages over local 
citizens or incentivize local couples to travel for the sake of getting married 
(or both), neither of which advances the forum state’s interests. 
Instead, a marriage-like state should simply treat a same-sex couple 
lawfully married in a marriage state as having entered into the local 
marriage equivalent. This way, the marriage-like state vindicates its own 
policy interests, both in the sense of recognizing and encouraging mutual 
commitment for same-sex couples and in the sense of preserving its 
opposition to same-sex marriage. This should be the default position 
applicable unless a state statute or constitutional provision explicitly 
prohibits the state from adopting it—an unlikely result, since this would 
harm the state’s own interests. 
Next, consider the reverse situation: a couple unioned in a marriage-like 
state moves to a marriage state. Again, there is no true conflict in the sense 
that both the marriage and marriage-like state offer essentially identical 
utilitarian aspects of marriage. Thus, it makes little sense for the marriage 
state to reject any recognition whatsoever, for in doing so, it would leave 
the couple unprotected and allow the spouses to go off and marry other 
people—undermining its own values. Instead, the marriage state should 
automatically treat the couple as married under forum law. It would be 
saying, in effect, that the couple has made all of the commitment necessary 
to be recognized as married both for utilitarian and normative purposes. 
Finally, consider the situation in which a lawfully married or unioned 
                                                                                                                     
 140. See Conn. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 2005-024 (2005), 2005 WL 2293060, at *1.  
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same-sex couple moves to a marriage-lite state. The state should not reject 
the relationship altogether because it would undermine the state’s interest 
in encouraging couples to enter into committed (albeit limited) 
relationships; and, once again, doing so would have the perverse effect of 
allowing them to enter into relationships with yet other people, 
undermining whatever interest the state has in creating stable and 
monogamous same-sex relationships. Again, though, the state should not 
treat the couple as married because doing so would undermine the state’s 
utilitarian and normative interests in withholding marriage from same-sex 
couples. Instead, the state should treat the couple as though it had entered 
into the local marriage-lite alternative.141 
In each of these situations, by focusing on the content of the 
relationships and the states’ interests in offering them rather than the 
formal titles that each of these states give to same-sex relationships, states 
can minimize conflicts and tailor the laws in such a way as to advance 
rather than undermine each state’s interests. 
2.  The True Conflict 
The true conflict is the remaining potential pattern in which a couple 
that entered into a marriage alternative in a marriage-lite state then moves 
to a marriage or marriage-like state. Here, there is a very real conflict. The 
forum state’s policy of recognizing only robust relationships does not 
allow it to recognize the marriage-lite relationship as such. It also does not 
make any sense for the state to automatically elevate the marriage-lite 
relationship to a marriage or marriage-like relationship because the couple 
has not undertaken that commitment (and indeed may not want it). In this 
                                                                                                                     
 141. The question of dissolution presents a wrinkle here. In the case of the marriage/marriage-
like conflicts, or vice versa, a dissolution under the forum state’s laws should be operative anywhere 
because both state’s interests are fundamentally compatible in nearly every way. However, a 
married or unioned couple that moves to a marriage-lite state and then seeks a dissolution faces a 
different situation. The marriage-lite state only recognizes a marriage-lite relationship, and it can 
therefore only dissolve that relationship. This would not necessarily have the effect of dissolving the 
marriage or marriage-like relationship for the purposes of states that would recognize that 
relationship. This problem is a difficult one to solve, but the easiest way of doing so is probably to 
create a mechanism whereby the marriage or marriage-like state that initially created the 
relationship retain power to dissolve it in the event that no other relevant state can do so. For an 
alternative view, see L. Lynn Hogue, Constitutional Issues in Same-Sex Divorce and the 
Dissolution of Civil Unions and Analogous Same-Sex Relationships: Fathoming DOMA’s Role, 41 
CAL. W. INT’L L.J. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 19–20). One might argue that a no-
recognition state should have no role dissolving foreign same-sex relationships (marriage or 
otherwise) performed elsewhere because the forum state does not wish for the couple to be in such a 
relationship in the first place. I believe that this argument is facile, and  no-recognition states may 
legitimately refuse to perform such dissolutions (assuming, of course, the baseline proposition that 
the federal Constitution does not compel recognition of same-sex marriage). After all, these states’ 
refusal to recognize same-sex relationships is not simply that they prefer that gay people not enter 
into legal relationships; it is that they refuse to recognize such relationships for all purposes. To 
dissolve a union, the state would first have to recognize that one exists, and to the no-recognition 
state, the foreign same-sex union is a non-entity. 
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case, then, following conflicts doctrine, the forum state should generally 
advance its own clearly articulated interests at the expense of the foreign 
state’s interests and refuse to recognize the relationship. 
Of course, with respect to those aspects of a marriage-lite relationship 
that are compatible with the interests and policies of the marriage or 
marriage-like forum state (for instance, if the forum state allows 
individuals to attain or adopt a particular right or responsibility through a 
contractual process independent of marriage), there is no true conflict, and 
the forum state should recognize that aspect of the marriage-lite 
relationship. In other words, the forum state should treat the couple as 
though it had entered into the contractual relationship permitted under 
forum law by entering the marriage-lite relationship in the foreign 
jurisdiction. 
V.  BEYOND THE MARRIAGE/MARRIAGE-LIKE/MARRIAGE-LITE 
CONFLICTS  
Beyond helping us resolve the marriage/marriage-like/marriage-lite 
conflicts, this analysis sheds light on two other important questions. First, 
it helps formulate a new approach to the marriage/no-recognition conflict. 
Second, it allows us to resolve any conflicts that arise in the event the 
federal government adopts a marriage-like or marriage-lite scheme. 
A.  The Marriage/No-Recognition Conflict 
Thus far, I have argued that the marriage/marriage-like/marriage-lite 
conflicts ought to be treated differently from the marriage/no-recognition 
conflict. And indeed, a state that has explicitly rejected any form of 
recognition for same-sex couples may be on fairly safe and well-trodden 
ground when it declines to extend recognition to same-sex couples married 
in other jurisdictions. This conclusion flows both from precedent142 and 
from the very interest analysis I have offered. All the same, the approach I 
have offered has significant implications for resolving some marriage/no-
recognition conflicts. 
The truth is that even no-recognition states have laws that recognize, or 
at least protect, same-sex relationships. Same-sex couples can provide for 
each other in their wills, and these wills are respected in no-recognition 
states. Also recognized, at least theoretically, are legal agreements 
directing decision-making in the event of incapacity, contracts governing 
property division, and other private agreements into which same-sex 
couples may enter.143 I do not mean to suggest that this is much or enough 
                                                                                                                     
 142. Melissa Murray, Remark, Equal Rites and Equal Rights, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1395, 1396 & 
n.5 (2008) (collecting cases). 
 143. It is worth noting that same-sex couples nevertheless sometimes face hurdles when it 
comes to enforcing these lawful agreements. See, e.g., Parker-Pope, supra note 9 (illustrating the 
frequent ineffectiveness of living wills, advanced directives, and power of attorney documents when 
one partner is hospitalized and the other partner wishes to exercise visitation rights). 
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protection—these are only a small subset of the rights that automatically 
come with marriage, marriage-like, or marriage-lite relationships—but they 
are still very real rights that same-sex couples enjoy. 
If we undertake a conflicts analysis and ask ourselves why even no-
recognition states permit same-sex couples to enter into these kinds of 
agreements, we can see why and how it makes sense to apply my approach 
to marriage/no-recognition conflicts.144 Recognizing and protecting these 
agreements advance many of the same interests for no-recognition states 
that recognizing marriage and marriage alternatives advances for marriage, 
marriage-like, and marriage-lite states: it is in the state’s interest to allow 
individuals to freely contract and to allow and encourage individuals to 
take responsibility for themselves and for one another and to provide notice 
to everyone else as to their wishes. For this limited set of rights and 
agreements, then, there really is no conflict between no-recognition states 
and the marriage, marriage-like, and marriage-lite states. In each case, the 
couple has entered into, in effect, a set of agreements in one state that the 
other state would independently recognize, uphold, and protect. Therefore, 
no-recognition states should apply the same approach and automatically 
treat couples who have lawfully entered into marriage, marriage-like, and 
marriage-lite relationships in other states as though they had entered into 
whatever private contracts would be embraced by those relationships and 
by forum law. 
The most obvious objection to this approach is that it ignores the formal 
requirements that no-recognition states attach to the contracts that same-
sex couples can enter into. For example, states require that a will be drawn 
in a particular kind of way. Obviously, the process of entering into a lawful 
relationship in a marriage, marriage-like, or marriage-lite state does 
nothing to comply with such formal requirements. It may be thus argued 
that no-recognition states should not recognize the relationships entered 
into in foreign states even to the extent that they would recognize a subset 
of agreements had they been entered into separately. 
However, putting this issue in doctrinal conflicts language, the question 
to ask is whether the forum state’s interest in upholding its formalities 
outweighs its interests in recognizing and encouraging mutual 
responsibility and upholding private agreements. Common sense suggests 
that it should not, and so does the law. First, formalities do not generally 
implicate a state’s public policy interests.145 Second, there is precedent for 
                                                                                                                     
 144. Of course, one reason that states might allow such private agreements is that it would 
likely be unconstitutional for them not to. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633–35 (1996) 
(holding that laws that discriminate on the basis of animosity, including those that make “a general 
announcement that gays and lesbians shall not have any particular protections from the law,” violate 
even rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause). But I doubt that states would want to 
prevent same-sex couples from entering into these contracts even if they could do so because it 
would be counter to their interests and policies. 
 145. See EUGENE F. SCOLES, PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS & SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, 
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the approach I have offered. The incidents of marriage cases I referenced 
earlier arose in the marriage/no-recognition context and, in some cases, 
recognized elements of marriage relationships despite the fact that the 
forum state would not recognize the marriage if performed locally.146 For 
instance, as we have seen, states that deemed interracial and 
consanguineous relationships to be against their public policy nevertheless 
recognized some aspects of the marriage for forum law purposes.147 Third, 
states routinely put aside forms requirements when it makes sense to do so. 
For example, a will executed in California may routinely be upheld in 
Georgia even if it does not conform to Georgia’s forms requirements.148 
There is little reason, I think, to exclude same-sex couples from this kind 
of flexibility. 
Applying my approach may appear somewhat radical at first glance. 
After all, states that have adopted constitutional amendments against 
recognizing same-sex couples emphatically disapprove of homosexuality. 
However, undertaking the interest analysis suggests that these states should 
extend at least those benefits to same-sex couples that have achieved 
government recognition in other states that such couples could 
independently and lawfully obtain under forum law. 
B.  The Federal Government and Same-Sex Relationships 
My approach will also help resolve conflicts that may arise if the 
federal government eventually adopts some kind of marriage alternative 
scheme. A federal marriage-like or marriage-lite bill is of critical 
importance to same-sex rights advocates because many of the benefits 
traditionally associated with marriage are available only from the federal 
government. These include partners’ access to social security, Medicare, 
Medicaid, disability and veteran benefits, health insurance, tax protection, 
and so forth. In total, the United States General Accounting Office reports 
that there are 1,138 such federal benefits associated with marriage, all of 
which are currently unavailable to same-sex couples regardless of whether 
they have entered into a marriage, marriage-like, or marriage-lite 
relationship authorized by the states.149 For this reason, a federal marriage 
alternative bill is very much on the agenda for same-sex rights advocates. 
So the push is certainly there. 
At the same time, the federal government may be receptive to such a 
bill in the foreseeable future. President Barack Obama announced support 
                                                                                                                     
CONFLICT OF LAWS 974 (4th ed. 2004) (noting that variations among contract requirements do not 
implicate public policy concerns). 
 146. See supra notes 90–95 and accompanying text. 
 147. Wardle, supra note 6, at 1893–97. 
 148. THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION GUIDE TO WILLS & ESTATES: EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO 
KNOW ABOUT WILLS, ESTATES, TRUSTS, AND TAXES § H, at 1–7 (2d ed. 2004). 
 149. Letter from Dayna K. Shah, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, to Bill 
Frist, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate (Jan. 23, 2004), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf. 
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for federal civil unions, as has Vice President Joe Biden.150 Indeed, both 
went so far as to promise full legal equality—apart from the word 
“marriage”—for same-sex unions under federal law.151 Even leading 
Republicans, like former President George W. Bush,152 former Vice 
President Dick Cheney,153 and former Utah Governor (and speculative 
presidential aspirant)154 Jon Huntsman,155 have spoken out in favor of civil 
unions. Not all of these politicians have advocated a federal marriage-like 
or marriage-lite scheme, of course. But there is fairly broad support among 
the political class for the general proposition that same-sex couples should 
be entitled to at least some recognition and protection from the 
government. Similarly, according to recent polling data, American public 
opinion is moving in the direction of greater acceptance for same-sex 
relationships and growing support for legal recognition,156 suggesting that 
opposition to a federal bill, while inevitable, will be something less than 
absolute. For these reasons, it is possible that a federal marriage alternative 
                                                                                                                     
 150. Michael Blood, Obama Argues for Civil Unions for Gays, FORBES, Aug. 9, 2007, 
http://www.barackobama.com/2007/08/09/obama_argues_for_civil_unions.php; Joe Biden on Civil 
Rights, ONTHEISSUES.ORG, http://www.ontheissues.org/2008/Joe_Biden_Civil_Rights.htm (last 
visited Oct. 16, 2010). 
 151. See Blood, supra note 150 (“‘As I’ve proposed [civil unions], it wouldn’t be a lesser 
thing, from my perspective.’” (quoting Sen. Barack Obama)); Joe Biden on Civil Rights, supra note 
150 (describing Joe Biden’s opinion that there should be “no distinction from a legal standpoint 
between a same-sex and a heterosexual couple” but that neither he nor Obama “support redefining 
from a civil side what constitutes marriage”). 
 152. See Good Morning America: ABC America Exclusive (ABC television broadcast 2004), 
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qL5qSiW3LUQ (last visited Oct. 16, 2010) (“I 
don’t think we should deny people rights to a civil union—a legal arrangement—if that’s what a 
state chooses to do . . . .”). It is not altogether clear whether President Bush supports civil unions or 
merely does not oppose them if states choose to adopt them. 
 153. Sam Stein, Cheney Offers Support For Gay Marriage, HUFFINGTON POST, June 1, 2009, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/06/01/cheney-offers-his-support_n_209869.html. Cheney 
supports not only civil unions but also same-sex marriage. See id.  
 154. See Chris Cillizza, The Rising: John Huntsman Jr., WASH. POST: THE FIX, 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/thefix/the-rising/the-rising-jon-huntsman-jr.html (Dec. 9, 2008, 
6:07 AM) (speculating that Huntsman may make a bid for the 2012 presidential election);  Cheney 
Says GOP Presidential Bench Still Strong, CNN POLITICAL TICKER BLOGS, 
http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2009/06/29/cheney-says-gop-presidential-bench-still-strong/ 
(June 29, 2009, 9:15 PM) (indicating that former Vice President Cheney mentioned Huntsman in 
his list of potential GOP presidential candidates). 
 155. Brock Vergakis, GOP Utah Gov Says He Supports Civil Unions, DAILY HERALD, Feb. 9, 
2009, http://www.heraldextra.com/news/state-and-regional/article_8738c4fc-dbca-5fb2-ba35-
3e0f9056121b.html. 
 156. Nate Silver, Two National Polls, for First Time, Show Plurality Support for Gay 
Marriage, FIVE THIRTY EIGHT BLOG, http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2009/04/two-national-polls-
for-first-time-show.html (Apr. 30, 2009, 6:00 PM); cf. Grossman, supra note 69, at 112 (“As we 
saw with interracial marriage, a deeply held belief against a practice can undergo a complete 
reversal with the passage of enough time.”). To be sure, such polls may be unreliable or outliers. 
But the point is that attitudes concerning same-sex relationships have shifted over time. 
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bill will be one of the next dominoes to fall in the steady progress towards 
marriage equality. If so, then this will raise the same conflicts question we 
have been analyzing here. 
Broadly speaking, a federal scheme could take one of two forms, each 
of which would raise conflicts. One approach might be for it to limit the 
availability of federal marriage-like or marriage-lite relationships to those 
couples that have entered into the state law equivalents. Such an approach 
would parallel the federal government’s traditional approach to marriage 
for cross-sex couples. That is, for cross-sex couples, the federal 
government leaves the question of whether a couple is lawfully married to 
the states. If the state performs a marriage, the federal government will 
recognize it as well; if the state refuses to perform the marriage, the federal 
government does not offer an alternative avenue for the couple. Applying 
this approach in the context of same-sex couples thus has the benefit of 
consistency with how the federal government treats cross-sex couples by 
continuing to defer to states on questions of family status. On the other 
hand, this first approach suffers from the consequence that same-sex 
couples residing in states that do not offer civil unions as an option—
which is currently the majority of states by far—would have no access to 
the federal rights being offered to others. Thus, the alternative (and perhaps 
more likely) approach would be for the federal government to create its 
own marriage-like or marriage-lite registry for same-sex couples 
everywhere.157 
Either approach would create marriage/marriage-like/marriage-lite 
conflicts. Suppose for the sake of argument that the federal government 
adopts a marriage-like scheme. Under the first approach, in which the 
federal government simply applies state law, would a same-sex couple that 
entered into its state’s marriage-lite relationship qualify for federal 
benefits? Would the federal marriage-like law exclude couples that lived in 
marriage states? With respect to the second approach, in which the federal 
government creates its own civil unions registry open to same-sex couples 
anywhere, would couples that entered into a marriage, marriage-like, or 
marriage-lite union under state law automatically qualify for the federal 
benefits, or would they be required to apply to the registry separately? 
What if one partner or spouse becomes incapacitated prior to becoming 
registered? 
My approach answers these questions. For the same reasons that it 
makes little sense for states to focus on form over substance, it also makes 
little sense for the federal government to do so. Thus, regardless of which 
of the two general approaches to civil unions the government takes, it 
ought to automatically extend benefits to those couples that have entered 
into relationships that are substantially similar to whatever type of union 
the federal government recognizes. In other words, if the federal 
                                                                                                                     
 157. There are, of course, possible variations on each of these models, but these are the 
prototypical possibilities. 
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government adopts a marriage-like scheme, it should automatically apply 
that scheme to same-sex couples that have attained state recognition in 
marriage and marriage-like states. However, just as marriage and marriage-
like states should not automatically extend recognition to same-sex couples 
that have entered into marriage-lite relationships, the federal government 
should decline to do so as well. 
VI.  CONCLUSION: THE CHANGING MEANING OF MARRIAGE 
The fact that states have developed these just-like-marriage-but-not-
exactly and sort-of-like-marriage-but-not-really alternatives reflects 
something about our evolving cultural and legal view of the nature of 
marriage. Traditionally, marriage has been about status. You either had 
marital status—social, cultural, historical, and religious in nature—or you 
did not; and people got married in order to attain that status. Traditionally, 
marriage demanded a lot of people and was difficult to exit.  
When same-sex marriage advocates began to demand marriage rights, 
they were, perhaps, seeking that same kind of status. But, of course, at that 
time, the idea that a same-sex couple deserved that status, that social cache, 
was quite radical. As a result, the argument for same-sex marriage became 
a utilitarian one: what does the state give the married couple, what does the 
couple give the state in return, and should same-sex couples be able to 
make that trade? Marriage was thus reconfigured into a series of contracts. 
Some of these contracts, which reflect mutually agreed-upon rights and 
responsibilities, are between the two spouses while others, also reflecting 
mutually agreed-upon rights and responsibilities, are between the couple 
and the state. 
The changes in the general conception of marriage relating to same-sex 
relationships have been consequential. First, these developments have 
made the equality-based argument in favor of marriage far more attractive 
and viable than the fundamental-rights-based argument.158 Under the 
                                                                                                                     
 158. For a fascinating debate as to whether equal protection or the fundamental rights/due 
process argument for same-sex marriage should or will make more inroads in courts, I recommend 
the online debate between Professors Kenji Yoshino and Heather Gerken. See Kenji Yoshino, 
Gerken-Yoshino Discussion of Liberty and Equality, CONVICTIONS: SLATE’S BLOG ON LEGAL ISSUES 
(May 21, 2008, 9:48 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/blogs/convictions/archive/2008/05/21/ger 
ken-yoshino-discussion-of-liberty-and-equality.aspx (asserting that courts must protect the rights of 
same-sex couples via a liberty analysis); Heather K. Gerken, Yoshino-Gerken on the 
Liberty/Equality Debate, BALKINIZATION BLOG (May 21, 2008, 11:36 AM), 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/05/yoshino-gerken-on-libertyequality.html (positing that 
Yoshino’s liberty approach is problematic and that an equality approach better suits courtroom 
debate); Heather K. Gerken, Gerken-Yoshino on the Liberty/Equality Debate: Round 2, 
BALKINIZATION BLOG (May 22, 2008, 9:27 AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/05/gerken-
yoshino-on-libertyequality.html (favoring, from a normative perspective, an equality approach); 
Kenji Yoshino, Gerken-Yoshino Debate on Liberty and Equality, Round 2, CONVICTIONS: SLATE’S 
BLOG ON LEGAL ISSUES (May 22, 2008, 10:17 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/blogs/convictions/ 
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earlier view, under which marriage was about personal status, it made 
sense to think about it as a fundamental right. But under today’s prevailing 
conception, in which marriage is really a utilitarian institution and just a 
bunch of contracts, why exclude same-sex couples who can make the same 
beneficial tradeoffs? Second, this shift opened the door for marriage-like 
and marriage-lite alternatives. Once the argument for marriage focused on 
the utilitarian benefits to the state and to the couple, then if those benefits 
could be achieved without the term “marriage” attached, thus avoiding 
some of the public backlash, then why not? The embrace of these marriage 
alternatives, in turn, reinforces the newer, contract-based conception of 
marriage. 
In some ways, this shift is a repeat of what we have seen in the context 
of property. There, as others have shown, we have seen a move away from 
an older conception of property rights as the status-based dominion over a 
physical object or space to a set of utilitarian and economically-beneficial 
rules about the rights to possess, dispose, and exclude.159 This suggests that 
our laws and cultural understandings are constantly in flux, so we should 
not be especially surprised or bothered that we are witnessing these 
changes with respect to marriage as well. 
I do not mean to suggest that there is a straight line running from the 
developments concerning same-sex relationships to a new understanding of 
marriage. Nor am I myopic enough to imply that the debate over same-sex 
marriage is the only, or even the primary, driver of changing attitudes 
towards marriage. Indeed, there are much larger and more longstanding 
trends associated with these changes. The sexual revolution and the push 
towards gender equality are obviously at work, and the changes are 
reflected in legal and cultural developments having nothing to do with 
same-sex relationships. These changes include laws that promote gender 
equality within marriage and that make it far easier to exit a marriage. They 
also include the rising number of committed cross-sex couples that choose 
not to marry.160 All of these cultural and legal developments are 
                                                                                                                     
archive/2008/05/22/gerken-yoshino-debate-on-liberty-and-equality-round-2.aspx (presenting a 
normative argument in favor of a liberty approach).  
For my own part, I am more persuaded by the equal protection argument, though I do think that 
advocates will continue to make both arguments, and different judges are likely to find different 
arguments persuasive (or unpersuasive, as the case may be). For a fuller explanation of my views, 
see Hillel Levin, Gay Rights: Equality or Due Process?, PRAWFSBLAWG (Oct. 2, 2008, 3:11 PM), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2008/10/gay-rights-equa.html. 
 159. See Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 371, 372–76 (2003) (providing the framework for a new “integrated theory” of property 
disposition that “serve[s] to give full meaning to the concept of property”); J.E. Penner, The 
“Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 818–20 (1996) (criticizing the 
“bundle of rights” conception of property and advocating a formulation of property rights “as 
comprising rights to any kind of value, to the extent of that value . . . .”). 
 160. Jocelyn Voo, Why Do Unmarried Couples Opt out of Wedlock?, CNN.COM, Sept. 19, 
2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/LIVING/personal/09/19/unmarried.couples/index.html. 
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intertwined with changing attitudes towards the nature, meaning, and value 
of marriage, and the battle over recognition of same-sex relationships is 
simply one aspect—cause and/or effect—of it. 
At the same time, we can see from the debates over same-sex marriage 
that the institution of marriage continues to retain its status-based 
character. If it did not, would there be so much opposition to marriage 
equality but relatively less to marriage-like and marriage-lite alternatives? 
And if it did not, why would same-sex rights advocates demand marriage 
rather than its functional marriage-like equivalent? We can see, then, that 
the status-based model of marriage is deeply entrenched in our culture, 
even as we move away from it. 
The approach I have offered takes as a given that different states will 
have different approaches—a menu of possible resolutions, in the 
formulation of Professor William Eskridge, Jr. and attorney Darren 
Spedale161—to the same-sex marriage question, but it navigates among the 
contested meanings of marriage in a way that makes the most sense for the 
states themselves and for the couples whose lives are deeply affected by 
states’ choices. 
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